

Innovation Investment and Labor Mobility: Employee Entrepreneurship from Corporate R&D

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Abstract

This paper studies how corporate research and development (R&D) investment affects labor mobility. We use employer-employee matched data in ordinary least squares and instrumental variables analyses to assess four hypotheses. R&D has no effect on worker retention, exit from employment, or mobility to incumbent firms. Instead, it increases employee departures to entrepreneurship, leading employees to join the founding teams of startups that are venture capital-backed, high tech, high wage, and in different sectors than the parent firm. These high-growth, high-risk startups emerging from R&D benefit from a focused, standalone incentive structure and have poor complementarities to the parent firm's assets.

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1 Introduction

Corporate research and development (R&D) investment is crucial to economic growth, generating new knowledge, technology, and skills. R&D is also human capital-intensive, and human capital is inalienable and portable. Employee mobility is therefore a channel for R&D outputs to leave the firm. Whether new intellectual assets are exploited within the firm or outside its boundary depends on where their value is highest and on limits to contracting with employees (Aghion & Tirole 1994, Zingales 2000). The relationship between innovation and human capital reallocation is important to understand, as these forces are central to productivity growth (Davis & Haltiwanger 1999, Giroud & Mueller 2015, Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin & Miranda 2018).

This paper offers to our knowledge the first study of how R&D investment affects employee mobility. We consider four possible effects, not all of which are unambiguously beneficial for employees. First, R&D could increase worker retention if it leads to more amenities or internal growth opportunities (Rosen 1986). Second, R&D may lead to automation or other structural changes that make labor redundant or skills obsolete, leading to layoffs and unemployment (Autor 2015, Acemoglu & Restrepo 2018). Third, R&D could create new skills or ideas that increase employees' outside options at other incumbent firms (Herkenhoff, Lise, Menzio & Phillips 2018). Finally, R&D could generate skills or ideas that are specifically valuable for the founding teams of new firms.

Testing the effect of R&D on labor reallocation requires matching R&D-performing employers to employees and following the employees' subsequent career paths. We accomplish this with U.S. Census data between 1990 and 2008. We consider firm R&D – a measure of innovation input – rather than patents because while patents are a useful measure of innovation output, they capture only the subset of innovation outputs that is contractible and over which the firm has chosen to establish property rights (Sampat 2018). We consider all employees rather than only inventors because the latter comprise a small fraction of the human capital involved in performing R&D and commercializing its outputs. Also, this permits considering broader mechanisms for how R&D might affect labor, including skill obsolescence.

We use two strategies to estimate the effect of R&D increases within publicly traded firms. The

first is a regression model with firm, state-year, and granular industry-year fixed effects, as well as time-varying firm characteristics. We find no effects on exits from the employment sample (which mainly corresponds to unemployment and departures out of the labor force), no effects on employee retention, and no effects of R&D on employee departures to other incumbent firms. We do find weak positive effects on employee departures to young firms, which points us in the direction of entrepreneurial outcomes.

Indeed, we find robust effects of within-firm R&D increases on employee departures to entrepreneurship, an intuitive and interesting result because startups are known to be important conduits for commercializing new ideas.¹ Specifically, a 100 percent increase in R&D (about one standard deviation) predicts an 8.4 percent increase in the mean rate of employee departures to entrepreneurship. We use the term “entrepreneurship” in a broad sense to mean the founding team of a new firm; the group most likely to contribute ideas and crucial skills to the startup.² Over the course of the sample, above- relative to below-median R&D changes within firms yield 8,291 additional employee-founded startups, which is 7.7 percent of all employee-founded startups in the data. As we would expect, the effect is higher among high-tech establishments of parent firms. It is not driven by recent hires (who might, for example, have been hired because of the R&D project). It is robust to alternative measures of both R&D and entrepreneurship, including the number of startups founded by recently departed employees.

Despite fine controls, the estimate may be biased if, for example, an unobserved new technological opportunity increases both the R&D of parents and employee-founded startups. The second approach is therefore to instrument for R&D using changes in state and federal R&D tax credits, which affect the firm’s user cost of R&D. The instruments do not permit us to affirmatively establish causality which would be the case if we could randomly allocate R&D across firms, but they

¹Entrepreneurs play a crucial role in prominent theoretical explanations for economic growth, including Schumpeter (1911), Lucas (1978), and Baumol (1990). Empirical literature has found that relative to incumbent firms, new firms have faster productivity and employment growth (Kortum & Lerner (2000), Foster, Haltiwanger & Syverson (2008), Gennaioli, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes & Shleifer (2012), Haltiwanger, Jarmin & Miranda (2013) Decker et al. (2014), and Glaeser, Kerr & Kerr (2015)).

²Our main entrepreneurship outcome is the share of an establishment’s employees who depart and are among the top five earners of a firm founded within three years. This captures founders and early employees. Similar variables are used in Kerr & Kerr (2017), Babina 2017, and Azoulay, Jones, Kim & Miranda (2018).

permit a rigorous robustness test of our main results. We follow Bloom, Schankerman & Van Reenen (2013) and provide new, exhaustive detail on the sources of within-firm variation for both instruments.

The instruments satisfy the relevance condition because there is much evidence that the elasticity of R&D to tax credits is at least one and does not reflect a relabeling of other expenditure. We also argue that the instruments are likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction, which is that tax credits cannot affect employee entrepreneurship except through the employer's R&D. First, the credits are not generally useful to startups because they typically do not have taxable income (Bankman & Gilson 1999). Second, numerous studies, including ours, find no direct association between changes in federal and state-level R&D tax credits and new firm formation. For example, while Lucking (2018) shows that state R&D tax credits lead to innovation-induced employment growth in new establishments of incumbent firms, there is no effect on new firms (see also Wilson 2009 and Curtis & Decker 2018). In sum, R&D tax credits are not directly useful for startups, but may indirectly affect new firm formation through the channel of corporate R&D, the outputs of which may depart the firm from various establishment types, including headquarters, manufacturing plants, and laboratories.

The instrumental variables (IV) analysis also finds that R&D has no effect on other types of employee departures or on employee retention. The IV effect on employee-founded startups is about five times larger than the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate. This could reflect downward bias in the OLS result. Alternatively, the IV strategy estimates the marginal effect of R&D (the effect of an additional "last" dollar), while OLS gives the average effect (the effect of increasing the optimal amount of R&D by one dollar). The causal effect may be higher for the last dollar if it is spent on projects that are further from the firm's core focus or have less crucial outputs, and thus are more often rejected. It is also possible that adjustable R&D, the type sensitive to tax credit changes, has a larger causal effect. The OLS yields our preferred estimate because we are most interested in the effect of average increases in R&D.

Our contribution is to show with an empirical approach that points strongly toward a causal relationship that R&D as an innovation input affects employee mobility to startups. Our finding offers a dynamic source – changing internal R&D – for the location of the firm boundary around new growth options. While the data do not permit us to pin down a precise channel for R&D-induced

entrepreneurial departures, we find cross-sectional support for a mechanism where employees take ideas, skills, or technologies created through the R&D process that are of relatively low value to the parent firm to startups. The starting point for motivating this mechanism is that the innovation process is serendipitous, producing unforeseen outputs. The second premise is that innovation effort is hard to contract ex-ante, and hard to verify ex-post. These information, agency, and contracting frictions create benefits to allocating control rights to the individuals who are performing innovation (Grossman & Hart 1986, Aghion & Tirole 1994). Contending with these frictions, the firm may opt not to pursue all good innovations, enabling employees to take some outside the firm.

Innovation frictions are magnified when an idea is riskier, making high-risk, high-reward growth options more often best located outside the firm boundary (Gromb & Scharfstein 2002, Robinson 2008, Frésard, Hoberg & Phillips 2017). Many risky ventures benefit from the high-powered incentives that exist in small, focused firms financed through external capital markets or in entities such as joint ventures (Rhodes-Kropf & Robinson 2008, Phillips & Zhdanov 2012). Consistent with this, we find that higher parent R&D is strongly associated with venture capital (VC) backing among employee-founded startups. This finding contributes to the literature on drivers of VC financing (e.g. Gompers, Gornall, Kaplan & Strebulaev 2019). Among dozens of observable parent firm characteristics, R&D is by far the strongest predictor of VC for employee-founded startups. Also, R&D-induced startups are more likely to be incorporated, more likely to be in high-tech sectors, pay higher wages on average, and are more likely to exit (fail or be acquired). Therefore, the effect appears to be driven by risky, new-to-the-world ideas, rather than Main Street-type businesses.

We expect the mechanism to be particularly salient when the idea is less valuable to the parent firm, which may more often be the case when the idea is far from the firm's core focus and would impose diversification costs. There is an abundance of evidence that diversification is negatively related to productivity (Mullainathan & Scharfstein 2001, Schoar 2002, Maksimovic & Phillips 2002, Seru 2014). From a boundary of the firm perspective, there is less reason for physical assets that are not complementary to reside within the same firm (Williamson 1975, Hart & Moore 1990, Rhodes-Kropf & Robinson 2008). Indeed, we find that more parent R&D is negatively associated with the employee-founded startup being in same broad industry as the parent. We also show using

supply chain relationships that R&D-induced, employee-founded startups are more likely to draw inputs from a broader array of supplier industries. The types of ideas that employees take to entrepreneurship seem to be those that benefit from focused, high-powered incentives and that are not especially complementary with the firm's existing activities.

Firms may permit employees to depart with R&D outputs as a way to induce retention and effort, especially if the lost ideas are peripheral. The long-term labor contract with employees may include some degree of permissiveness towards R&D-induced entrepreneurship. Such a policy could help the firm to hire the best talent and induce optimal effort. Relatedly, Guiso, Pistaferri & Schivardi (2012) and Howell & Brown (2019) show that labor contracts can trade off benefits for the worker and employer over time. A permissive approach to employee entrepreneurship is likely most feasible if the lost innovations are not ones the firm intends to sell or develop. Consistent with this, R&D outputs over which the firm does establish explicit property rights do not yield employee-founded startups. There are no effects of patents or patent citations on employee entrepreneurship.

Alternative channels may play some role, but they are not well-supported by the evidence. For example, employees may steal an idea that the firm values. If this were the primary driver, the effect should be smaller in states that strictly enforce noncompete covenants. Instead, those states exhibit a similar effect to that of states that weakly enforce noncompetes. We also find strong evidence that employees who depart do not cause the R&D increase, nor are they hired as a result of it. In particular, our effect is not driven by recent hires and is identified off of within-firm year-to-year changes in R&D spending.

R&D-induced employee entrepreneurship could be costly to the parent firm, may be priced into the labor contract, or may be a positive externality of R&D. Quantifying the costs and benefits of R&D-induced employee entrepreneurship is beyond the scope of this paper, but our finding is related to research on R&D spillovers (Arrow 1962, Griliches 1992, Jones & Williams 1998). The effect is a "spillover" in the sense of being a benefit of one firm's R&D that accrues to another firm. There would be no spillover only if the startup is a wholly-owned spinout and the parent fully internalizes its benefits. We present evidence that parent firms do not appear to internalize the benefits of R&D-induced startups by investing in or acquiring them. That said, we cannot rule out parents sometimes

having licensing or investment contracts with R&D-induced startups.

This paper joins the literature on innovation and labor mobility. Perhaps the closest papers to ours are Balsvik (2011), who shows that knowledge spillovers across countries can occur through employee movement within multinationals, and Hombert & Matray (2016), who show that a credit supply shock affects inventor mobility at small firms. Also related is Chatterji (2009), who shows that in the medical device sector, startups founded by former employees of incumbent firms perform better than other new entrants. While there are many studies of knowledge diffusion, to our knowledge there is no work on how innovation investment affects labor mobility.³ Studying R&D investment rather than patent-based variables permits us to consider a wider range of employees and a wider range of outcomes, including labor displacement.

We also contribute to the growing literature on the interactions between labor and finance, which has studied financial mechanisms that affect labor reallocation. Tate & Yang (2015) show that diversified firms have more active internal labor markets that encourage labor reallocation and human capital accumulation. Maksimovic, Phillips & Prabhala (2011) and Ma, Ouimet & Simintzi (2016) find that mergers and acquisitions lead to restructuring of employment, changes in wages, and the composition of occupations. Babina, Ouimet & Zarutskie (2018) study the implications of going public for workers. We add to this literature by documenting that R&D investment predicts labor reallocation to startups, but does not lead to layoffs due to restructuring.

Finally, we contribute to the entrepreneurship literature. The positive effect of R&D on entrepreneurship that we document is one mechanism for why high-growth startup founders are often former employees of large incumbent firms (Gompers, Lerner & Scharfstein 2005, Klepper 2009). We offer corporate R&D as a new source for where ideas for high-growth startups come from, a topic of considerable recent interest (Aghion & Jaravel 2015, Babina 2017).

³Other work on knowledge diffusion through employees includes Oettl & Agrawal (2008), Breschi & Lissoni (2009), Poole (2013), and Tambe & Hitt (2013).

2 Hypothesis development

This section presents four not mutually exclusive or exhaustive hypotheses about how innovation investment interacts with firm boundaries through labor mobility. Specifically, corporate R&D may have a positive effect on employee (1) Retention; (2) Departures from the labor force; (3) Mobility to other firms; and (4) Entrepreneurship. As we are focused on how R&D affects accumulation of exposed human capital, we do not consider new employees, but this is a fruitful avenue for future research. This section concentrates on (4), as it has the richest theoretical motivation and is the only one with empirical support. We further offer two predictions about (a) the type of R&D-generated growth option that is most likely to locate in a startup; and (b) the circumstances under which an idea may be more valuable in a standalone firm founded by the employee than in the parent firm.

Hypothesis 1: Corporate R&D has a positive effect on employee retention.

The purpose of R&D is to create growth options for the firm. If R&D leads to growth, it is possible that existing workers are less likely to leave, leading to a causal positive effect of R&D on employee retention. It could increase job advancement opportunities. R&D could also make the firm a more interesting place to work; that is, it might increase workplace amenities (Rosen 1986). For example, R&D may lead to new product development that is stimulating for the employee.

Hypothesis 2: Corporate R&D has a positive effect on departures from the labor force.

R&D may lead to automation or other structural changes that make labor redundant or skills obsolete, causing layoffs (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2014, Autor 2015). Even if innovation investment is associated with new labor-intensive tasks that are complementary with labor-replacing technology, as in Acemoglu & Restrepo (2018), we may expect that some individuals will not have the requisite skills to transition to the new tasks, and automation or digitization will lead to an increase in departures to unemployment. Finding a positive effect of R&D on departures from the labor force among low-wage workers would shed light on the decline in the low-skill labor share of national income.

However, it may be that automation is reflected in capital expenditure, and does not have a

direct relationship to R&D. An alternative mechanism for R&D to increase layoffs is if it is associated with restructuring. R&D outputs could cause the firm to pursue a new strategic direction, and find some existing workers no longer useful. For example, GM's decision to lay off more than 14,000 employees in North America in late 2018 was in part attributed to its new focus on electric vehicles and autonomous driving technology.⁴

Hypothesis 3: Corporate R&D has a positive effect on employee mobility to other firms.

It is well known that knowledge diffuses across firms, a phenomenon that is crucial to explaining economic growth (Arrow 1962, Griliches 1992). The R&D process is human capital-intensive, requiring creative effort on the part of employees. This innovation effort is hard or impossible to contract on ex-ante, and hard or impossible to verify ex-post (Grossman & Hart 1986 and Aghion & Tirole 1994). These contracting frictions could lead R&D to induce more employee mobility to other incumbent firms. That is, for some employees R&D may create better outside options at peer firms. This could involve stealing ideas that the firm would prefer to retain in-house, talent poaching, or it may reflect the firm permitting employees to leave with ideas that it does not find especially valuable.

To our knowledge, there are no existing tests of whether R&D investment has a causal effect on labor mobility. However, extensive existing work on labor mobility and knowledge diffusion motivate this hypothesis. For example, Singh & Agrawal (2011) find that when inventors move between firms, they make use of their existing inventions, which benefits the hiring firm. Similarly, Tambe & Hitt (2013) find that productivity spillovers occur when IT workers move between firms. Other literature on inventor mobility and knowledge spillovers includes Almeida & Kogut (1999), Agrawal, Cockburn & McHale (2006), Matray (2015), Hombert & Matray (2016), Moretti & Wilson (2017), and Herkenhoff, Lise, Menzio & Phillips (2018). Finally, individuals are also known to play an important role in international knowledge flows (Oettl & Agrawal 2008, Docquier & Rapoport 2012, and Poole 2013).

⁴See [here](#).

Hypothesis 4: Corporate R&D has a positive effect on employee entrepreneurship.

Contracting and verification frictions imply that growth options emerging from R&D may sometimes be optimally developed outside of the firm's boundaries in new, standalone firms, because there are benefits to allocating residual rights of control to the party that performs innovation. As incentives to invest increase with control rights, integration is not always optimal. If the employee is responsible for the investment necessary to incubate an idea, he may exert optimal effort only in his own firm. Frésard, Hoberg & Phillips (2017) model these frictions to innovation explicitly in the context of vertical integration. They conclude that control rights should be allocated to stand-alone firms in especially R&D-intensive industries and when the innovation is as yet unrealized; that is, when innovation requires more unverifiable effort. Acemoglu, Griffith, Aghion & Zilibotti (2010) also theorize that technology intensity should be associated with less vertical integration.

A slightly different perspective on the contracting problem of innovation suggests that it may be optimal for the firm to permit some R&D-induced entrepreneurship as part of a long-term contract with employees. This perspective emerges from the participation and incentive compatibility constraints of the labor contract. Suppose that corporate innovation requires partially unobservable employee effort, and innovation serendipitously yields some outputs that are more valuable for the employee to pursue in a standalone firm than in the R&D-performing firm. The firm can (a) give nothing to the employee, and perhaps try to sell the idea; (b) try to share the idea with the employee, perhaps through a joint venture; or (c) permit the employee to leave the firm with the idea. If the firm can commit to allowing employees to "walk away" with relatively less valuable ideas, this reward may help the firm to hire the right talent (the participation constraint) and induce optimal effort (the incentive compatibility constraint). Related to this idea, Kondo et al. (2019) model the importance of trust in the firm-inventor relationship; to maintain its reputation, the firm enables the inventor to pursue some of his own ideas. In their model, this long term implicit contract ultimately increases the efficiency of R&D investment.

In sum, in the presence of information asymmetry, agency problems and incomplete contracting, there are benefits to developing a risky new idea in a new venture rather than within the parent firm. This may cause R&D to have a positive effect on employee entrepreneurship. Further, such an allocation of control rights implies that external capital markets, such as venture capital, will

be better sources of financing than internal capital markets.

Hypothesis 4a: R&D-induced employee-founded startups are more likely to be risky and potentially high-growth.

Agency frictions are magnified when an idea is riskier, making high-risk, high-reward growth options more often best located outside the firm boundaries, because such ventures benefit from the incentive alignment inherent to small, focused firms. Gromb & Scharfstein (2002) model whether a new venture should be pursued within the established firm (“intrapreneurship”) or outside the firm. They note that scientists and executives commonly leave large companies and launch their own ventures. Their mechanism rests on the higher-powered incentives of the entrepreneur. When the new venture has potentially large payoffs and high failure risk, the benefits of locating the idea outside the firm in a new business outweigh the safety net benefits of intrapreneurship.

A different possible mechanism is elucidated in Robinson (2008). When embarking on risky projects, the firm cannot commit to not divert resources if the project fails. As a result, managers are unwilling to supply effort ex-ante. This makes it optimal to locate risky projects in a distinct legal entity outside the firm boundaries. The firm can then contract with the new legal entity, committing not to “pick winners” ex-post. While our setting does not feature alliances as an outcome (in fact, we find that parent firms do not appear to benefit from R&D-induced startups), the underlying mechanism of inadequate effort provision helps explain why risky, diversifying ideas would leave the firm (see also Lindsey 2008).

Hypothesis 4b: R&D-induced, employee-founded startups are more likely to develop new ideas or technologies that are far from the parent firm’s core focus and have poor complementarities with its existing assets.

When a firm rejects a new idea that would diversify the firm’s activities, employee-founded startups may be a byproduct. One way this may occur is through the long-term contracting perspective described above, to motivate *Hypothesis 4*. The firm is likely to permit employees to depart with R&D outputs as a way to induce retention and effort if the lost ideas are peripheral to the

firm, rather than in its area of core focus. Therefore, we expect that the firm will be most permissive towards employee entrepreneurship with businesses that would be diversifying if pursued in-house. As one example of what a diversifying idea might look like, consider the agricultural insurance startup WeatherBill (later renamed The Climate Corporation and ultimately acquired by Monsanto). Its founders, David Friedberg and Siraj Khaliq, left Google in 2006 to launch the new firm, which used artificial intelligence insights from Google to better price insurance.⁵ Google may be more permissive of employee entrepreneurship in areas such as financial services, which are relatively far from its main focus.

There is also a boundaries of the firm argument. In the transaction cost-based theory of the firm, Williamson (1975) and Klein, Crawford & Alchian (1978) theorize that vertical integration reflects the importance of relationship-specific investments between transacting parties. Specific investments between separate firms create hold-up problems, or opportunities for one party to threaten to leave. Hart & Moore (1990) describe the firm as a set of property rights over physical assets, where residual rights of control (all non-contracted aspects of usage) reside with the owner of the asset. Only when physical assets are complementary will hold-up problems dictate integration within a single firm.

A more recent literature pushes forward this theory and links it to empirical facts. Rhodes-Kropf & Robinson (2008) demonstrate that when physical assets are more complementary, a merged firm will have greater surplus than two separate firms. The “picking winners” problem described above from Robinson (2008) is exacerbated for projects that would diversify the firm. Empirical work finds a negative correlation between firm performance and diversification (Lang & Stulz 1994, Schoar 2002).⁶ There is also practitioner evidence that sustained corporate success demands discipline in rejecting good opportunities that would make the firm’s activities excessively diffuse (Collins 2009, McKeown 2012). Efforts to explain diversification discounts have identified additional mechanisms, including the role of firm characteristics in the optimal degree of diversification (Campa & Kedia 2002, Maksimovic & Phillips 2002, Graham, Lemmon & Wolf 2002). These explanations for equilibrium diversification

⁵See [here](#).

⁶Relatedly, using data from the laser industry, Klepper & Sleeper (2005) focus on employee-founded startups that are also in the laser industry. They nonetheless find that these startups tend to target different customer segments than the parent.

are consistent with a costly diversification mechanism explaining why a specific project might find itself optimally located outside the firm boundary.

In sum, if an R&D-generated idea is far from the firm’s core focus and has weak complementarities, there is less reason for the new product to be integrated with the parent firm. Permitting the employee to take ownership and thereby residual rights of control may maximize investment incentives. In this case, we expect that R&D-induced startups would more often be in different broad industries from their parents. More generally, a permissive policy towards employee-founded startups could allow the firm to maintain the benefits of focusing on existing products and customers and could dynamically incentivize employees to maximize effort.

3 Data

We use data from five sources: Compustat, the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and its Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) data, ThomsonOne VentureXpert, and the NBER Patent Data Project. This section describes each source of data and explains the key variables we use in our analysis. It also discusses potential concerns with the data.

3.1 Data sources

Our measure of corporate innovation investment is R&D expenditure as reported in 10-K filings and provided by Compustat. We restrict the sample of potential “parent” firms to public firms with positive R&D.⁷ We primarily use log R&D but show that the results are robust to using R&D divided by total assets. We merge Compustat to the restricted-access LBD using a Census-provided crosswalk. The LBD is a panel dataset that tracks all U.S. business establishments with paid employees. An establishment is a discrete physical location operated by a firm with at least one paid employee. The

⁷R&D expenditure is only available for public firms. We use firms with positive R&D for two reasons. First, firms that report R&D are likely qualitatively different from firms that do not in ways that might affect employee entrepreneurship, despite rigorous controls and fixed effects (Lerner & Seru 2017). Second, our primary specification will be focused on the intensive margin; since we use firm fixed effects, firms with zero R&D provide no variation. However, in a robustness check we include all Compustat firms and find similar results to the main specification.

LBD contains a unique firm-level identifier, *firmid*, which longitudinally links establishments that are part of the same firm. Incorporated businesses rather than sole proprietorships or partnerships comprise about 83 percent of the LBD.⁸ For further details about the LBD, see Jarmin & Miranda (2002). We use the 1978-2011 LBD for firm-level variables and to identify new firms. We require parent firm establishments to have at least 10 employees. Following Haltiwanger et al. (2013), we define firm age using the oldest establishment that the firm owns in the first year the firm is observed in the LBD. A firm birth is defined when all of its establishments are new, preventing us from misclassifying an establishment that changes ownership as a startup.

A challenge when studying how R&D affects labor reallocation is that we must observe employees and track them from firm to firm. We solve this with the LEHD, which provides quarterly firm-worker matched data. The data contain employees' wages, gender, race, place and date of birth, and citizenship status. The LEHD has been widely used in economic research (e.g., Tate & Yang 2015 and Goldin et al. 2017). In covered states, the LEHD includes over 96 percent of all private-sector jobs (BLS 1997, Abowd et al. 2009). About 12 percent of workers in year t are not in the LEHD in year $t + 3$. This is a similar attrition rate to that seen in the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS).⁹ Abowd et al. (2009) describe the construction of the LEHD data in detail.

Coverage begins in 1990 for several states and increases over time, ending in 2008. We have access to 31 states, in which we observe all employee-founded startups.¹⁰ These states do not include the innovation hubs of California and Massachusetts. Their absence does not compromise the relevance and importance of our analysis. Our data include research-intensive states such as North Carolina and Texas; as a point of comparison, in 2017 venture capitalists invested about \$1.8 billion in Texas and \$1.9 billion in all five Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland, and Denmark), which have individually been settings for important past research on entrepreneurship.¹¹ Public

⁸This is observable using the publicly available Census County Business Patterns data, which are built from the same Business Register that is the basis for the LBD.

⁹The CPS tracks workers for a maximum of 16 months. In the CPS data, among private sector employees who are observed 15 months later, about 9 percent drop out of the employment sample (data available [here](#)).

¹⁰The states we observe are: Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.

¹¹See NVCA 2018 Yearbook [here](#), and Pitchbook's European Venture report [here](#).

companies with significant R&D headquartered in our states include Amazon, Microsoft, ExxonMobil, General Dynamics, Red Hat, 3M, and Celgene, among many others. In our states, we also observe establishments of public firms headquartered in uncovered states. For example, IBM is headquartered in New York but has a research lab in Austin, Texas. Switzerland-headquartered pharmaceutical giant Novartis has a large R&D operation in New Jersey. In sum, we observe meaningful quantities of innovation and high-growth entrepreneurship.

More systematically, 60 percent of U.S. employment, or about 150 million people, and 52 percent of U.S. inventors are located in our states.¹² Using LBD data, we calculate that 10.7 percent of firms are aged three years or less in our states, compared to 10.6 percent in all states. Our data are also representative at the industry level, as shown in Appendix Table A.1.¹³ For example, in the 1990-2001 period, Manufacturing represents 15.4 percent of employment in our sample states, and 15.8 percent of employment in other states. In the 2002-08 period, Professional and Business Services (which includes information technology companies such as Google) represents 12.3 percent of employment in our sample states, and 12.8 percent of employment in other states. In Section 5.6 below, we consider external validity. However, a final note on this topic is that our research question may be especially policy-relevant to states that are not the leading innovation hubs. The effect of R&D on worker reallocation – especially R&D induced by local tax credits – is important for states actively seeking to promote innovation and entrepreneurship.

In the LEHD, workers are identified with firms' state reporting units, or State Employer Identification Numbers (SEINs). Each SEIN contains state and industry information. We link SEINs to firms in the LBD using federal employer identification numbers present in both datasets. For ease of exposition, we term SEINs "establishments." We do the linkage in the first quarter of each year since the annual LBD measures employment and payroll in March. We drop establishments with less

¹²We use LBD data to calculate the former statistics and comprehensive USPTO patent data between 1990 and 2005 to calculate the latter.

¹³Specifically, we compare our data to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Employment Statistics Survey from 1990-2008. According to the BLS, employment data come from a voluntary, state level stratified sample of firms that is adjusted for population using monthly state unemployment insurance records. First, we divide state-industry employment by total state employment across all states for each year, and then take the average of this object across years. We conduct the same calculation for states out of our sample. A second calculation considers the share of people employed in an industry in our sample states versus the other states. The results are in Appendix Table A.2. The share of employment for each industry is quite similar to the overall share of employment we observe.

than 10 employees, as they tend to have noisy reporting.¹⁴ This yields an annual panel of public firm establishments (i.e., SEINs), in which employees are observed as of the first quarter of each year.

To identify VC-backed startups, we use the Puri & Zarutskie (2012) link from ThomsonOne VentureXpert to the Census Business Register. We use patent data from the NBER Patent Data Project, which includes patents linked to Compustat through 2006. We employ several annual, patent-based variables at both the firm and industry level. These are the number of patent classes a firm or industry patents in, the number of patents, the number of forward and backward citations, and the average, maximum, and median patent generality and originality. Generality is higher when forward citations are in many classes, and originality is higher when backward citations are in many classes.

3.2 Identifying employee outcomes

Our final sample consists of an annual panel of public firm establishments in 31 states between 1990–2005, with employees followed through 2008. We measure departure rates at the establishment level, rather than the firm level or employee level, for several reasons. First, public firms often have operations in multiple industries and/or states. Establishment-level analysis permits including as controls industry-year and state-year fixed effects as well as establishment workforce characteristics and wages. Second, the more disaggregated data allow cross-sectional tests. For example, Amazon has warehouses and business service offices. Using establishment-level data, we can test if the effect of R&D within Amazon is different in business offices than in warehouses. Third, we do not use employee-level observations in our primary approach as they create an artificially large amount of power, since variation in R&D occurs at the firm level. However, the results are robust to employee-level analysis (Section 5.4).

We begin by observing workers at public firm establishments (denoted e) in the first quarter of year t , and the quantity of R&D investment in year $t - 1$. Using longitudinally consistent individual identifiers in the LEHD, we follow employees one, two, and three years after year t . They may move to other incumbent firms, which we define as firms that exist before year t , stay at the R&D-performing

¹⁴We obtain similar results if we drop establishments with less than five or less than 15 employees.

firm, or drop out of the employment sample. About 94 percent of workers in the “drop out” group go to unemployment or exit the labor force. Only around six percent depart to locations outside our LEHD data coverage.

Identifying employee-founded startups is challenging because the LEHD does not provide information on equity ownership. Our aim is to capture members of new firms’ founding teams, who contribute crucial early stage ideas and skills. The measure is in line with prior research using executive teams, including Gompers et al. (2005). We focus on the highest earners to identify founders and early employees with important human capital. Azoulay et al. (2018) find that a firm’s top three initial earners usually include the firm’s owners. This is because the W-2 data that is the basis for the LEHD must be filed for all employees, including owners who actively manage the business and are required by law to pay themselves reasonable wage compensation.¹⁵ Our primary definition of an employee-founded startup is a firm founded between t and $t + 3$ in which any of the parent firm establishment’s employees at year t is among the top five earners as of $t + 3$.¹⁶ We show the effect on a range of other entrepreneurship measures to demonstrate robustness (see Section 5.4).

3.3 Summary statistics

Table 1 Panels 1-3 contain summary statistics at the parent firm-year, parent establishment-year, and employee-founded startup levels, respectively. We show the mean for indicator variables, as well as the quasi-median and the standard deviation for continuous variables.¹⁷ Our dependent variables are measured at the establishment-year level as explained above (Panel 2). For all outcome variables, we divide by e ’s employment in year t to give, for example, the establishment rate of employee entrepreneurship. On average, 26 percent of an establishment’s employees move to other incumbents (firms that existed before year t employment at a public firm), and 7.2 percent move to firms that are

¹⁵See [here](#).

¹⁶The lag is motivated by the time necessary to start a firm and to identify the effects of R&D, which might not be immediate. We examine the timing of departures in Section 5.4.

¹⁷As Census disclosure procedures prohibit the disclosure of percentile values, we approximate the median with a quasi-median, which is estimated using a 99 percent weight on observations within the interquartile range and a 1 percent weight on the remaining observations. The number of observations and all estimates in the tables are rounded according to the Census disclosure requirements.

less than 10 years old. The rate of employee entrepreneurship is 1.3 percent. Similarly, Kerr, Kerr & Nanda (2015) find in LBD/LEHD matched data that 1.7 percent of workers become entrepreneurs over a four-year period. Panel 3 of Table 1 describes the 108,000 employee-founded startups identified in the LBD. In their first year, the new firms have on average 12 employees, and 70 percent are incorporated businesses. Two percent ever receive venture capital funding, which is 18 times the rate of VC backing among the whole population of new employer firms (Puri & Zarutskie 2012).

There may be concern that employees depart the firm and found a startup in an entrepreneurial hub such as Silicon Valley. This may sometimes occur, but it is likely rare. Guzman (2019) finds that only 0.2 percent of new firms move to Silicon Valley in their first two years, based on data about all businesses registered in 26 states between 1988 and 2014. Note that if a startup has at least one employee in the home state before moving, we observe them. To the degree that former employees move to an uncovered state before hiring an employee, these individuals are counted in our outcome variables as having dropped out of coverage. If this phenomenon is important, we should observe a positive effect of R&D on dropping out of the labor force, but we do not.

4 Empirical approach

The primary estimation strategy, a tightly controlled fixed effects regression, is introduced in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we explain our instrumental variables strategy.

4.1 Main model

Our main approach consists of variants on the OLS regression in Equation 1, where e denotes an establishment, f a firm, and t the year:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Employee outcome}_{e,f,t+3} = & \beta \ln(\text{R\&D}_{f,t-1}) + \text{Firm FE}_f + \text{Industry-year FE}_{e,t} \\ & + \text{State-year FE}_{e,t} + \xi \text{Controls}_{f,t} + \zeta \text{Controls}_{e,t} + \varepsilon_{e,f,t}. \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

Our primary independent variable is log R&D among firms with positive R&D (the results are robust to including non-R&D performing firms and using R&D/Assets). We employ firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant differences across firms. This means that we mainly compare the same employees before and after an R&D change, so effects do not stem from firm-worker matching (we also find that the effect is not driven by recent hires). Industry-year fixed effects (using SIC three-digit codes) control for changes in investment opportunities. We also use SIC four-digit codes in some specifications. State-year fixed effects control for regional shocks, which may affect investment opportunities at incumbents as well as entrepreneurship. Note that these fixed effects ensure that proximity to omitted states should not be correlated with any mis-measurement. We cluster standard errors by firm, following the suggestion in Bertrand et al. (2004) to cluster by the cross-sectional unit that is the source of treatment variation.

Time-varying establishment and firm controls address other concerns. We control for establishment number of employees in case, for example, smaller establishments have more focused or autonomous cultures and thus lead to more employee entrepreneurship. We also control for the establishment's average wage. We further include the following firm-level controls: return on assets, sales growth, Tobin's Q, asset tangibility (measured as plant, property and equipment investment divided by total assets), size (log total assets), cash holdings, age, and diversification (an indicator for firms having establishments in multiple SIC three-digit industries).

4.2 Instrument for R&D

Endogeneity may bias the OLS estimates of Equation 1. An unobserved demand shock or new technological opportunity that is not captured by the granular industry-year fixed effects may jointly engender parent R&D and employee reallocation. This is a version of the Manski (1993) reflection problem and would bias the estimates upwards. The ideal experiment would randomly allocate R&D to firms and observe labor reallocation. This is infeasible, so we use the best available instrument: changes in the tax price of R&D following Bloom et al. (2013). While this IV strategy is imperfect, we show that it is well-suited to our context and is likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction.

4.2.1 Instrument motivation and assumptions

We use two instruments: federal and state tax credit changes, which affect the firm's cost of R&D capital. The state tax credit must be aggregated to the firm-level. This is necessary because R&D is only observable at the firm level, but it is also intuitive in our setting because the outputs from R&D investment may depart the firm from a variety of establishment types, including headquarters, manufacturing plants, and laboratories. Where R&D is located for tax purposes need not be the place where R&D outputs depart the firm via employees. In practice, following Bloom et al. (2013), our state instrument uses inventor locations to approximate where the R&D occurs.

As with any instrument, causal interpretation rests on assumptions about an underlying economic model (Kahn & Whited 2017). One assumption is relevance: Firms must react to R&D tax credits by increasing their R&D investment. The underlying model is one where a lower cost of capital for R&D leads firms to spend more on R&D. The literature has established that R&D tax credits have strong effects on corporate R&D in the short and long term. For the federal tax credit, the elasticity has been estimated to be well below -1, such that reducing the tax price of R&D capital by one dollar stimulates more than a dollar of additional R&D. This evidence includes Hall (1993), McCutchen (1993), Mamuneas & Nadiri (1996), Hall & Van Reenen (2000), Billings et al. (2001), Bloom et al. (2002), Klassen et al. (2004), Clausen (2009), and Rao (2016). The high sensitivity of expenditure to the R&D tax credit may reflect the fact that firms tend to finance R&D out of free cash flows (Brown & Petersen 2011).¹⁸

There is also evidence that state R&D tax credits increase R&D within the affected state, as shown by Paff (2005) and Wu (2008), among others. The most conservative finding is in Wilson (2009), where a one percentage point increase in the state tax credit rate increases R&D by 1.7 percent in the short term and 3 to 4 percent in the longer term. Wilson (2009) also finds that the tax credits lead firms to reallocate R&D geographically. Since large, multi-state firms are responsible for most R&D expenditures, and they may shift R&D across states in response to the tax credits while our independent variable is firm-wide R&D, we expect the state instrument to be weaker than the federal one.

¹⁸There is similar evidence of large positive elasticities for foreign programs, including in Canada and the UK (Dechezleprêtre, Einiö, Martin, Nguyen & Van Reenen 2016, Agrawal et al. 2014, and Guceri & Liu 2017).

R&D stimulated by tax credits does not simply reflect relabeling of existing related expenditures. Dechezleprêtre et al. (2016) show that a UK R&D tax credit increases patenting and citations. Balsmeier, Kurakina & Fleming (2018) find that California’s R&D tax credit increases patenting, and the additional patents are particularly valuable. Beyond patents, Czarnitzki et al. (2011) and Cappelen et al. (2012) find positive effects of tax credits on product and process innovation, respectively.

We discuss the exclusion restriction in the context of entrepreneurship, which is the only outcome for which we find an effect. The restriction is that tax credits cannot affect employee entrepreneurship except through the employer’s R&D. Startups do not usually use R&D tax credits because they typically do not have taxable income (Bankman & Gilson 1999).¹⁹ We demonstrate in Appendix A.1.3 that there is no relation between the state tax credits and startup creation. Curtis & Decker (2018) show in a border county differences-in-differences model that R&D tax credits have no effect on new firms. Wilson (2009) and Lucking (2018) also do not find employment effects among new firms, only existing firms. The fact that R&D tax credit changes do not affect a state’s total number of startups is consistent with our main result, which uses changes in R&D to suggest that the overall level of corporate R&D may be an important source of high-growth startups. If R&D tax credit changes affect startup creation only through marginal corporate R&D changes, tax credit changes are unlikely to yield a measurable effect on the state’s aggregate number of startups. It is important to emphasize that this paper is not about the macroeconomic effects of R&D tax credits. Instead, we are focused on whether corporate R&D yields employee-founded startups.

In sum, while imperfect, R&D tax credits offer the best available source of quasi-exogenous variation driving corporate R&D. Most importantly, they are plausibly unrelated to technological or demand shocks that could jointly give rise to parent R&D and employee reallocation. For further discussion of concerns with the instruments, see Appendix A.1.3.

¹⁹The presence of carryforwards may make the credits somewhat useful to some startups, but our evidence in the Appendix suggests any effect is not large enough to be measurable.

4.2.2 Summaries of the tax credits

Appendix Section A.1 contains details about the credits and their calculations, which are summarized here. Changes in tax credits affect firm incentives to invest in R&D, because they change the firm-specific user cost of R&D capital. The tax credits are not deductions. Instead, they reduce the firm's corporate income tax liability by the value of the credit. The first instrument is the federal tax price of R&D, which we denote as $\rho_{f,t}^F$. It has annual changes for most firms and is firm-specific for a number of reasons (Hall 1993). For example, it depends on firm age and past sales, and includes tax loss carryforwards. It is calculated as a nonlinear function of these and other firm variables, so we can control for these variables directly in the IV. It is also worth noting that none of the variables on which the credit depends predict employee departures to entrepreneurship. We find substantial within-industry variation in the tax price of R&D, as well as the necessary variation within firm over time.

The state instrument requires two objects: the state tax price component of the R&D user cost of capital ($\rho_{s,t}^S$), and a measure of the share of a firm's R&D that occurs in a given state ($\theta_{f,s,t}$). We use the state tax price of R&D from Wilson (2009), which incorporates state level corporate income taxes, depreciation allowances, and R&D tax credits. These credits vary across states and time. To build $\theta_{f,s,t}$, we follow Bloom et al. (2013) and use the share of the firm's patent inventors located in state s . The firm's state-level tax price is then $\rho_{f,t}^S = \sum_s \theta_{f,s,t} \rho_{s,t}^S$.

4.2.3 First stage estimation

Having constructed the firm-level federal and state tax prices of R&D ($\rho_{f,t}^F$ and $\rho_{f,t}^S$ respectively), we estimate the following first stage regression:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(R\&D_{f,t}) = & \beta_1 \ln(\rho_{f,t}^S) + \beta_2 \ln(\rho_{f,t}^F) + \text{Firm FE}_f + \text{Industry-year FE}_{e,t} \\ & + \text{State-year FE}_{e,t} + \xi \text{Controls}_{f,t} + \zeta \text{Controls}_{e,t} + \varepsilon_{e,f,t}. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

R&D tax credits could have other effects in the state. As in the Equation 1, our IV estimation includes state-year and industry-year fixed effects. These will absorb any aggregate effects.

The results are in Table 2. The instruments are strong, yielding F-statistics of about 25, well

above the rule-of-thumb cutoff of 10. The partial R^2 of the two instruments ranges from 2.2 to 3.2 percent, which captures a reasonable amount of variation in R&D (Jiang 2015).²⁰ As expected, the federal instrument is stronger than the state instrument. Bloom et al. (2013) use only firm and year fixed effects. This is equivalent to column 1. In column 2, we add firm time-varying controls, which reduce the magnitude of the effects somewhat but do not affect their statistical significance. Our preferred specification, with SIC three-digit industry-year and state-year fixed effects, along with firm time-varying controls and firm fixed effects, is in column 5. The results are also robust to using SIC four-digit industry fixed effects (column 6).²¹

5 Results

In Section 5.1, we test *Hypotheses 1-3*. We present the main results for *Hypothesis 4* – the effect of R&D on employee entrepreneurship – in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. Alternative measures of entrepreneurship and R&D, as well as heterogeneity in parent firm characteristics, are considered in Section 5.4 and 5.5. Further robustness tests are in Section 5.6.

5.1 Effects on retention, layoffs, and mobility to incumbents

We begin by testing whether R&D affects retention, departures from the labor force, or mobility to other incumbent firms. The effects of R&D on these outcomes are reported in Table 3 using the OLS and IV approaches. We focus on the OLS results, as this is our preferred model for entrepreneurship (discussed below), though the results are not qualitatively different using the IV.

Columns 1 and 2 show that there is no effect on the share of an establishment’s employees who remain at the firm. The effect in column 1 of -1.13 implies a decrease of 2.4 percent relative to the mean of 48 percent. The 95 percent confidence interval is between -5.3 percent and 0.01 percent. Columns

²⁰We expect that firms without taxable income would benefit less from R&D tax credits. Indeed, when we interact R&D with profitability (EBITDA/Assets), we find that while the independent effect of R&D remains positive and significant, the effect is significantly larger for more profitable firms.

²¹We find that R&D tax credits do not predict total investment, only R&D investment. We are grateful to Shai Bernstein for suggesting this placebo test.

3 and 4 show no effects on exit from the employment sample; we can rule out effects outside the 95 percent confidence interval bounds of -2.2 percent and 2.1 percent of the mean. This implies that R&D does not lead to automation or other structural changes that make labor redundant. Columns 5 and 6 show no effects on moves to other incumbent firms. The OLS coefficient in column 5 permits us to rule out effects outside the 95 percent confidence interval bounds of -6.5 percent and 2.8 percent of the mean. This null result suggests that either R&D does not increase employees' outside options at peer firms, or that the parent prevents such departures (e.g., through labor contracts).

We do find positive effects on moves to young firms. Column 7 of Table 3 indicates that a 100 percent increase in parent firm R&D is associated with an 4.8 percent increase in the employee departure rate to incumbent firms less than 10 years old, relative to the sample mean. The IV estimate is larger, but less precise (column 8). When we require the young incumbent firm to be high tech, the coefficient of 0.23 represents a 5.4 percent increase relative to the sample mean (column 9). The IV result has no significance (column 10). Together, these results show that R&D has no measurable effect on labor reallocation except to firms that are close to startups, pointing us toward entrepreneurship.

5.2 Effect on employee entrepreneurship

Estimates of the effect of R&D on employee entrepreneurship using Equation 1 (OLS) are in Table 4. Our preferred specification in column 5 of Panel 1 includes firm, industry-year, and state-year fixed effects (column 3 replicates the specification reported in Table 3). The coefficient of 0.109 implies that a 100 percent increase in parent firm R&D or approximately one standard deviation in R&D is associated with an 8.4 percent increase in the mean rate of employee departures to entrepreneurship, relative to the sample mean of 1.3 percent.²² The result is robust to a wide array of alternative controls and fixed effects, shown across the eight models in Panels 1 and 2.²³ Column 2 employs establishment-level

²²As R&D is in log units, the coefficient means that a 1 percent increase in R&D increases employee entrepreneurship by .109/100.

²³Some controls are denoted with a lag ($t - 1$) and others are not. This is because firm-level controls are measured when R&D is measured (year $t - 1$), but establishment-level variables are measured when the employee snapshot is taken (first quarter of year t). We do not report them in further results because the Census Bureau strictly limits the number of coefficients we may disclose. The controls are at the firm level, except for employment and payroll which are at the establishment level. The only control with consistent predictive power is employment; employee entrepreneurship is negatively associated with the establishment's number of employees.

controls. Establishments with a higher share of white workers or foreign-born workers are associated with more employee entrepreneurship. The results do not attenuate with wage controls, so the effect is not driven by an increase in employee wages. The result is robust to using SIC four-digit industry fixed effects (Panel 1 column 4 and Panel 2 column 1).

To shed light on which employees depart to entrepreneurship, we compare them with employees who depart to incumbent firms. We are particularly interested in wages at the parent firm as a measure of human capital. Table 1 Panel 4A shows that movers to startup founding teams and to incumbents are similar by employee age, tenure, and education. Future founders are somewhat more likely to be male and white. Founders' wages, however, are almost 50 percent higher. Table 1 Panel 4B shows that the parent (R&D-performing) employing firm has similar characteristics across the two groups, and Panel 4C compares the startup and incumbent destination firms. In sum, workers who depart to entrepreneurship have much higher wages than those who depart to incumbents, despite otherwise similar observable characteristics, suggesting that they are either managers, highly skilled, or both.

5.3 Instrumented effect on employee entrepreneurship

The results from the instrumented second stage are in Table 5. We repeat the main specifications from Table 4. The coefficients are statistically significant and larger than the OLS results.²⁴ Our preferred specification, in column 5, is about five times the OLS estimate. The larger IV effect indicates that the subset of R&D expenditures affected by the tax credits leads to greater employee entrepreneurship than the average increase in R&D. This could reflect endogeneity that biases the OLS result downward. Alternatively, the local average treatment effect for compliers with the instrument may be larger than the population average treatment effect. As Angrist & Imbens (1995) and Jiang (2015) explain, this can lead to a larger IV effect even if the exclusion restriction is satisfied. Firms with R&D that is more sensitive to the tax price of R&D may have a higher causal effect of R&D on employee entrepreneurship.

²⁴It may initially seem inconsistent that the state instrument uses patent locations to proxy for the location of R&D, yet patenting does not predict employee entrepreneurship (see Table 4 Panel 2 column 3). The firms responsible for the IV result are patenting in general, but changes in their number of patents produced do not predict employee departures to entrepreneurship. It is also worth noting that the IV effect persists when using only the federal instrument.

There are two closely related explanations for such a phenomenon. The first is a correlation between propensity to generate employee-founded startups and adjustable R&D. Adjustable R&D may be more general or inventive, and thus more often yield innovations best suited to development outside the firm. It is not obvious why adjustable R&D would be more inventive, but we cannot rule it out. More plausibly, adjustable R&D is less crucial to the firm. The loss of the innovation output to employee-founded startups would then be less costly, implying lower ex-ante incentives to prevent employee entrepreneurship. That is, suppose the firm expects R&D to lead to some employee-founded startups. When the loss of these employees and ideas is expected to be costlier, the firm should increase R&D less in response to the tax price shock. The second and perhaps more straightforward explanation is that the marginal effect of R&D is higher than the average effect. OLS estimates the effect of an additional dollar of average R&D. The IV strategy, which uses additional R&D tax subsidies to approximate increased R&D expenditure on the margin, better captures the effect on employee entrepreneurship of the “last” R&D dollar. The output from marginal R&D may be less costly to lose, perhaps because it is less predictable or farther from the firm’s core focus.

We take the OLS result as our preferred model, both because it gives the average effect of increasing R&D, which is the economic object we are most interested in, and because it is more conservative. However, the IV analysis has a policy implication. It shows in a partial sense that R&D tax credits lead to employee entrepreneurship (note we do not assess the net effect of R&D on entrepreneurship, so we cannot speak to welfare effects). In an assessment of business tax incentives, Glaeser (2001) writes that “externalities are more likely to be associated with small start-ups than with large established companies....Chicago’s subsidy for Boeing can be best understood if the Boeing employees are likely to start their own start-ups after they leave Boeing.” This applies to our context in the following way: The firm cannot fully capture the benefits of R&D because some outputs depart with entrepreneurial employees. This leads the firm to invest less in R&D than it would have otherwise. Such underinvestment is one justification for the government subsidy of corporate R&D (Feldman & Kelley 2006, Howell 2017).

5.4 Alternative employee entrepreneurship measures

To demonstrate that our entrepreneurship result is not sensitive to a particular construction of the outcome variable, we consider alternative measures of employee entrepreneurship in Table 6. First, we consider the number of employee-founded startups rather than the number of departing employees. This is because team exits, where multiple employees depart together to a new firm, could explain the results. The dependent variable in Panel 1 columns 1-2 is the number of employee-founded startups from an establishment, normalized by employment at $t = 0$. The coefficient implies that a 100 percent increase in R&D leads to a 5.8 percent increase relative to the mean, indicating that team exits do not explain the main results. Second, the effect is robust to including only incorporated employee-founded startups (Table 6 Panel 1 columns 3-4).

We also find a similar result using only the top three earners at the new firm rather than the top five (Table 6 Panel 1 columns 5-6). The result is further robust to restricting employee-founders to those employed at the new firm in the first year it appears in the LBD with positive employment (Panel 2 columns 1-2). In Panel 2 columns 3-4, we consider only startups founded by year $t + 2$. We continue to find a positive, significant coefficient using this more immediate measure. We then consider one-year-old startups in year $t + 2$. The effect of R&D remains significant (Panel 2 columns 5-6). When we consider one-year-old startups in year $t + 3$, the effect is positive but insignificant (not reported). Therefore, R&D-induced departures to entrepreneurship occur in the first two years after the investment in R&D.

Last, we find similar results at the employee level. Appendix Table A.3 shows OLS and IV effects of R&D on the probability an individual worker transitions to entrepreneurship, defined as being among the top five earners at a new firm within three years. We use two models of fixed effects, and include employee controls, specifically age, age squared, education, total experience in years, tenure at the firm, log earnings as of $t = 0$, and indicators for being female, white, foreign-born, and born in state. The result in column 1 implies that a 100 percent increase in R&D leads to a 5.3 percent increase in employee entrepreneurship at the worker level. (The mean of the dependent variable is 0.0091 percent.) As in our main estimates, the IV effect is larger (columns 3 and 6).

5.5 Parent heterogeneity and alternative R&D measures

We look for evidence that the effect is driven by establishments where R&D-generated ideas are likely to come from. R&D is observed at the firm level, but entrepreneurship is measured at the establishment level. We therefore implicitly assume that R&D is evenly distributed across establishments. A new idea or technology need not leave the firm at its earliest stage; the firm may reject the new idea while it is in development or early commercialization. Therefore, R&D-induced employee entrepreneurs may emerge from various places in the firm. In general, however, we expect that R&D-generated ideas are more likely to be located in high-tech establishments. Industry is coded at the establishment-level, and there is substantial within-firm variation in establishment industries.²⁵ Using an interaction between R&D and an indicator for the establishment being high tech, we find that that the effect comes from high-tech establishments (Table 7 column 1).²⁶ There is no significant effect for non-high-tech establishments (the independent coefficient on R&D). The fact that high-tech establishments are responsible for the effect is consistent with its source being employees engaged in the R&D process. It fits the Franco & Filson (2006) prediction that employee entrepreneurship is more likely to come from technologically advanced firms. This result also suggests that if the effect is different in California and Massachusetts, it is likely higher.

Patenting activity provides a second source of confirmation. General-purpose patents are used in a wider array of fields (specifically, future cites are from a wider array of patent classes). We interact R&D with an indicator for the firm having above-median patent generality and find a significantly higher effect for these firms (Table 7 column 2). Also firms that patent in more classes tend to have higher employee entrepreneurship rates (Table 4 Panel 2 column 5). Thus, firms doing broader research have more employee-founded startups per dollar of R&D.

Our results are robust to alternative measures of R&D, as shown in Appendix Table A.4. When the independent variable is an indicator for an above median change in R&D, the effect is .089, significant at the .01 level (column 1). This implies that moving from the bottom to the top half of

²⁵Among firms in our sample, the quasi-median firm has establishments in five industries (measures using three-digit SIC codes). We define an establishment as “high tech” if its industry is in biotech, chemicals, software and business services, or high-tech manufacturing & R&D.

²⁶We do not use the IV estimator in this table because there is insufficient power to identify the interaction term of interest.

R&D changes increases the rate of employee entrepreneurship by seven percent. We find a similar effect on the number of new employee-founded startups (column 2). This permits a back-of-the-envelope calculation that above-median relative to below-median R&D changes lead to 8,291 additional employee-founded startups over the sample period, which is 7.7 percent of all employee-founded startups in the data.²⁷ Appendix Table A.4 columns 3 and 4 use indicators for high and low changes in firm R&D. Column 3 implies that moving from the bottom 90 to the top 10 percentiles increases the employee entrepreneurship rate by 12 percent. The effect turns negative for the bottom 10 percentiles of R&D change (column 4). We also find that the effect is robust to using R&D divided by total assets, rather than the change in R&D (column 5). This confirms that the effect is not an artifact of small changes in R&D.²⁸

5.6 Robustness

If the effect is causal, employee entrepreneurship should not predict R&D. To test this, we project R&D in year t on past employee entrepreneurship in Appendix Table A.5. In column 1, we include one year of employee entrepreneurship, from year $t - 2$ to year $t - 1$. In columns 2 and 3, we include two years ($t - 3$ to $t - 1$) and three years ($t - 4$ to $t - 1$), respectively. In all cases, the coefficient is insignificant. This helps to allay the primary endogeneity concern, which is that an unobserved technological opportunity jointly causes R&D and employee entrepreneurship. Since the nature of a startup is to be adaptable and responsive to new opportunities, we expect startup founding to respond to such an unobserved new opportunity faster than corporate R&D. In contrast, we find that employee entrepreneurship occurs after R&D.

Another possible source of endogeneity is that R&D may lead the firm to hire new employees, who are inherently more likely to start their own ventures than the average worker. In this case, workers with relatively short tenures would drive the effect. In fact, our effect is not driven by employees with

²⁷The calculation is as follows. As there are 329 employees in an establishment-year on average, the coefficient implies an increase of 0.23 employee-founded startups per establishment-year, which we multiply by the 36,000 establishment-years to arrive at 8,291 new firms.

²⁸Another concern is that because some firms have multiple SEINs per state-year, our results could be driven by variation within firm-state-year that we are not capturing. Our effects are robust to excluding these firms.

short tenure. Further, R&D has no effect on entrepreneurship among employees hired within a year of when R&D is measured, and a positive effect (in both OLS and IV) among employees who were at the firm for at least three years before R&D is measured.²⁹ Therefore, hiring related to the increase in R&D does not drive the effect.

6 Mechanisms

This section considers evidence for *Hypotheses 4a* (Section 6.1) and *4b* (Section 6.2), as stipulated in Section 2. In Section 6.3, we discuss how our patent results reflect incomplete contracting, which is crucial to our proposed mechanism. Evidence against alternative mechanisms is in Section 6.4, though we do not claim that these are entirely non-operative.

6.1 High-risk high-growth

Our first test of *Hypothesis 4a* concerns VC backing. VC-backed startups are widely known to be risky, associated with new-to-the-world ideas, and potentially high growth (Kaplan & Lerner 2010, Gornall & Strebulaev 2015). In Table 8 we examine whether parent R&D is associated with certain startup characteristics.³⁰ The dependent variable in Table 8 Panel 1 column 1 is one if the employee-founded startup receives VC. The coefficient on R&D is 0.007, which is significant at the .01 level. This implies that a 100 percent increase in R&D predicts a 35 percent increase in the chances that an employee-founded startup is VC-backed. Among parent firm observables, R&D is by far the strongest predictor of VC-backed, employee-founded startups.

Levine & Rubinstein (2017) show that incorporation is a good indicator of high-growth intent in the sense of “business owners engaged in non-routine, innovative activities.” R&D-induced startups are more likely to be incorporated (Table 8 Panel 2 column 1). We also expect high-risk, high-growth ventures emerging from R&D to be high tech, which is the case (Table 8 Panel 2 column 2). Further,

²⁹These results are unreported due to disclosure limitations.

³⁰These regressions do not include firm fixed effects. As a relatively rare event, entrepreneurship provides limited variation for within-firm comparisons. The regressions should, therefore, be interpreted as well controlled associations. To the degree the results have pointed toward a causal relationship, this is appropriate for exploring mechanisms.

R&D induces employee-founded startups with higher wages than the average employee-founded startup, suggesting that they employ higher skilled labor (Table 8 Panel 2 column 3). Finally, we consider the rate of exit, which we view as a proxy for risk, comprised primarily of firm failures. In column 4, the dependent variable is one if the startup exits within five years (starting from year $t + 3$, where t is the year in which we measure R&D). We find a positive, significant association with R&D. In sum, relative to the average employee-founded startup, those induced by R&D are more likely to be high impact, high tech, and high risk, consistent with *Hypothesis 4a*.

6.2 Costly diversification

Hypothesis 4b of a costly diversification mechanism fits well with the interpretation of the IV results in which ideas leading to employee entrepreneurship are more likely to come from the last dollar of R&D than the first. In this light, the IV strategy isolates the driving mechanism: marginal R&D more often generates ideas far from the firm's core focus, some of which spill into employee-founded startups. The following subsections consider cross-sectional and supply chain evidence.

6.2.1 Cross-sectional evidence

We begin by comparing parent and startup industries. In column 5 of Table 8 Panel 2, the dependent variable is one if the employee-founded startup is in the same two-digit SIC classification as its parent. Two-digit industries are quite broad; examples are Business Services, Health Services, and Coal Mining. We find that more parent R&D reduces the chances that the startup is in the same industry as its parent; a 100 percent increase in R&D makes it 4.2 percent less likely that the employee-founded startup is in the same industry as its parent.

It may initially seem counter-intuitive that R&D leads employees to found firms in different industries. However, consider three examples. First, in 1894, Henry Ford left Thomas Edison's Illuminating Company to launch his own venture. Two years later, he produced the first Ford Quadricycle with the help of a local angel investor (Glaeser 2011). Edison would be in SIC 49 (Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services), while Ford is in SIC 37 (Transportation Equipment). Yet Ford

relied on mechanical and electrical engineering advances made at Edison's company. Second, in the 1990s, Michael Rosenfelt worked for the computer memory company Micron Electronics, where he helped to revitalize its PC business. He left in 1999 to found Powered Inc., a successful online education company that exploited marketing innovations from Micron.³¹ Micron Technology is in SIC 36 (Electronic and other Electrical Equipment), while Powered, Inc. would be in either SIC 73 (Business Services), or SIC 82 (Educational Services). Finally, consider the example of WeatherBill from Section 2. Founded by former Google employees, WeatherBill would be in SIC 63 (Insurance Carriers). Google's parent company Alphabet is in SIC 73 (Business Services). In all three examples, an R&D-intensive parent spawned a new firm in a different two-digit SIC sector, but the underlying idea or skill was related to the parent's intellectual capital. These examples highlight how SIC assignments reflect the firm's market more than its technology. It seems likely that R&D-induced startups employ innovation related to the parent's technology but apply them to a different market.

Seru (2014) proposes that information asymmetries between headquarters and divisional management helps to explain why conglomerates perform less productive R&D. We expect such information asymmetries to be more acute in large firms. We find that large firms, defined as having above-median total assets in a given year, drive the effect (Table 7 column 3). We do not find significant interactions between R&D changes and measures of firm diversification, but this may reflect the fact that there is little variation in diversification measures within R&D-performing firms. These results are consistent with *Hypothesis 4b*.

6.2.2 Supply chain relationships

To explore links between the startups and their parents, we consider supply chain relationships. We use the U.S. BEA annual input-output tables to create annual measures of supply chain closeness between the parent firm's industry and the startup's industry. The measures assign one party to be upstream and the other to be downstream. The first measure is "downstream closeness," which is the downstream industry's share of the upstream industry's product. The second measure is "upstream closeness,"

³¹For evidence of success, see [here](#), [here](#), and [here](#).

which is the upstream industry's share of what the downstream industry uses.³² For both measures, a higher value means they are closer.

The results are in Table 8 Panel 3. We first assign the parent to the upstream industry, and the employee-founded startup to the downstream industry. There is a positive association with the “downstream closeness” measure (column 1). This means that R&D-induced startups tend to buy a relatively larger share of the parent's product than the average employee-founded startup.³³ The effect of “upstream closeness” is negative, which means that the parent's product tends to make up a relatively smaller share of the R&D-induced startups' inputs (column 2). Therefore, R&D-induced startups tend to be downstream from the parents but require a broad array of inputs – not just from the parent, but from other industries as well. When we assign the employee-founded startups to the upstream industry, and the parent to the downstream industry, we find no effect of downstream closeness (column 3). We find a weak positive effect of upstream closeness (column 4), implying that the R&D-induced startup's product tends to make up a somewhat larger share of the parent's inputs.

Together, the results demonstrate a tie between R&D-induced startups and their parents. Relative to the average employee-founded startup's industry, the R&D-induced startup's industry buys a larger share of the parent industry's product and also supplies a larger share of the parent industry's inputs. Personal ties to the supplier firm may be part of what makes the employee's new human capital more valuable outside the firm. However, the R&D-induced startup departs from the parent in that it requires more inputs from other industries. With diverse required inputs, many of the transactions required for commercialization would be outside the parent firm anyway, helping to explain why vertical integration might not be optimal. This is consistent with the R&D-generated new venture being farther from the parent's core focus.

³²Downstream closeness is built using the BEA “Make table,” which contains the production of commodities by industries, where industries are in rows, and the columns represent commodities (products) that the industries produce. Given industry pair A and B, if A is the “industry” and B is the “commodity,” downstream closeness is B's share of A's row. Upstream closeness is built using the BEA “Use table,” which contains the use of commodities by intermediate and final users, where commodities are in rows, and the columns represent the industries that use them. Given industry pair A and B, if A is the “industry” and B is the “commodity,” upstream closeness is B's share of A's column. We use two-digit NAICS codes. Data are available [here](#).

³³To the degree the spawn purchases from the parent, this does not imply that the parent benefits from the spawn. For example, if both industries are competitive, the spawn can presumably buy the input from alternative suppliers at the market price.

6.3 Incomplete contracting

R&D investment yields innovations in a highly uncertain, serendipitous manner. Sometimes, the outputs will not be useful to the firm. One indicator of this is if the effect of R&D on employee entrepreneurship emerges from those innovation outputs over which the firm does not establish explicit, contractible ownership (Kim & Marschke 2005). Patents measure R&D outputs that the firm has chosen to appropriate. We find that neither the number of patents nor the number of patent citations have an effect on employee entrepreneurship (Table 4 Panel 2 column 3). We also find no significant interaction between parent R&D and the number of patents or patent citations.

To explore whether the employee-founded startups and parents are in sectors that tend to share knowledge, we create two measures of patent citation flows between industries. The first measure is inflows: for patent classes A and B, this is B's cites of A as a share of the total cites to A. The second measure is outflows: A's cites of B as a share of all the citations from A. We create this measure at the class-year level, and then assign patent classes to industries using the patent-to-SIC concordance developed by Kerr (2008).³⁴ When we interact R&D with these measures of knowledge sharing, we find no effects. This supports the conclusion that our results reflect R&D output that is not patented. Ellison, Glaeser & Kerr (2010), who also use this knowledge-sharing measure, find weak effects, and suggest that "knowledge sharing... may be captured more by input-output relationships than by these citations." We view these null results for contractible outputs (patents) as important evidence of the role of incomplete contracting in innovation. Theoretically, it is natural that innovation spillovers – those R&D outputs that cross the firm boundary – are primarily composed of non-contractible outputs.

6.4 Alternative mechanisms

6.4.1 Project management skills

It may be that exposure to R&D makes employees more productive as entrepreneurs because they gain experience managing new projects. This channel may play a role. However, three pieces of cross-sectional evidence suggest that it seems unlikely to be the primary driver. First, we expect that

³⁴We are especially grateful to Bill Kerr for his help with this exercise.

capital expenditure would have a similar effect on employee entrepreneurship if the channel were skills, because it is likely to create project management skills. Instead, Table 4 Panel 1 shows that there is no effect of total investment or PPE investment on employee entrepreneurship. We would also expect R&D-induced startups to come from small parents. This is because small firm employees tend to have a broader scope of work (Stuart & Ding 2006, Sørensen 2007). Instead, large firms drive the effect (Table 7 column 3). We might also expect that there is more opportunity for entrepreneurial learning at young firms. However, we find no effect of an interaction between R&D and firm age (unreported).

A related mechanism is whether firms that have recently gone public drive the effect. In this case, it may reflect employees “cashing out” their stock options rather than R&D (Babina, Ouimet & Zarutskie 2018). In Table 7 column 4 we interact R&D with an indicator for having had an IPO within the last three years. The interaction is insignificant.

6.4.2 Idea stealing

With perfect information, the parent firm could appropriate all good skills and innovations that emerge from R&D and contract with the employee ex-ante so that he will not depart to start his own firm. The mechanism of costly diversification – precisely because of contracting and information frictions – is almost certainly accompanied by some costs to the parent of employee entrepreneurship. Our finding may highlight a “dark side” to R&D investment from the firm’s perspective. We cannot calculate the magnitude of costs to the parent firm. However, several pieces of evidence suggest that costly stealing of ideas is not the main mechanism.

First, we expect a costly stealing effect to attenuate in states that enforce noncompete covenants. Noncompetes restrict employees from working for a competing firm within the state for a specified period of time. It has been found that noncompete enforcement reduces local R&D spillovers (Belenzon & Schankerman 2013, Matray 2015) and within-state inventor mobility (Marx, Singh & Fleming 2015). The main result persists in states that enforce noncompetes, and there is no significant effect on an interaction between R&D and an indicator for being in a weak enforcement state (unreported). Second, a costly effect should attenuate when intellectual property is easier to protect. This makes it easier to contract on innovation effort. We do not find that the effect varies with

a measure of industry patentability.

Finally, there is a revealed preference argument. By virtue of observing the robust phenomenon of R&D-induced employee entrepreneurship, the parent either chose not to develop the idea in-house or chose not to take ex-ante steps to prevent the employee-founded startup. Such steps could include increasing the employee's compensation to retain him, or not conducting the R&D at all (see also Anton & Yao 1995).

6.4.3 Employee interaction with R&D change

There is concern that the employee who departs for entrepreneurship causes the R&D increase or is hired as a result of it. The first possibility is obviated by the IV strategy, where we identify the effect of R&D on employee-founded startups using only variation in R&D explained by its tax price, which the employee does not control. The second possibility is unlikely because we find a significant result using only workers with above-median tenure, as discussed earlier.

6.4.4 Internalization of startup benefits

It may be that the parent captures some of the startup's benefits, perhaps through a licensing or investment contract. If the parent wholly owns the spinoff and captures all its benefits, then the effect we observe is not an R&D spillover in the sense of being a benefit of R&D that accrues to a firm besides the R&D-performing firm. The data do not support full internalization. First, we expect parent-supported spinoffs to start at a larger scale than a typical bootstrapped startup. We find no relation between initial employee-founded startup size and parent R&D (unreported). Second, spinoffs or parent reorganization should sometimes maintain the same establishment. Startups are defined in our data as firms with no prior activity at any of their establishments.

We also look for internalization in an out-of-sample test based on the underlying data in Gompers et al. (2005). This exercise is described in detail in Appendix Section A.2. We examine what share of the 6,499 unique VC-backed startups in the Gompers et al. (2005) data was acquired by startup executives' previous employers. This should yield an upper bound on internalization. Just 2.3 percent of the 9,152 unique parents match to an investor or acquirer, providing evidence that parents

rarely invest in or acquire employee-founded startups.

Consistent with the out-of-sample test, there is no effect of an interaction between R&D and the parent having a corporate VC program (see Gompers, Gornall, Kaplan & Strebulaev 2018). This is related to the Ma (2016) finding that public firms tend to launch corporate VC programs when internal innovation is poor and tend to invest in startups in their own industries. That is, corporate VC is a way to outsource innovation. This is the opposite of the environment that yields R&D-induced employee entrepreneurship. An alternative is that patents jointly held or otherwise licensed across the parent and the startup permit a degree of internalization. Since patenting has no effect on employee entrepreneurship, this seems unlikely.

7 Conclusion

Human capital is central to modern theories of economic growth (Romer 1990, Jones 2014). Though the literature has focused on schooling (Card 2001, Cunha & Heckman 2007), firms also play a role in human capital formation. Corporate research effort yields ideas that are first embodied in people and then ultimately in new types of capital inputs (Mankiw, Romer & Weil 1992, Jones 2002). In this way, R&D imparts new skills and ideas to employees. This paper shows that a share of these outputs are reallocated to startups through employee mobility. We find a positive effect of R&D on labor reallocation to startups, but not to other incumbent firms or to departures from the labor force.

Much of the innovation literature focuses on innovation outputs, especially patents and patent citations. This paper takes a novel approach by examining a likely unintended consequence of innovation input, measured as R&D investment. Its outcomes are uncertain, serendipitous, and difficult to contract on. Employees, with their inalienable and portable human capital, create a porousness to the firm's boundary, providing an avenue for R&D outputs to leak to other firms. Consistent with influential theories of the firm, R&D-induced startups are more likely to be high risk and potentially high growth. They seem to reflect projects rejected by the firm because they are far from existing activities and the firm faces costs to diversifying.

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Table 1: Summary Statistics

<i>Panel 1: Firm-year level variables</i>			
	Mean	Quasi- median	Standard deviation
Made corporate VC investments _t (%)	3.8		
Had ≥ 1 patent _{t-10,t} (%)	60.1		
Diversified _{t-1} (%)	78.9		
R&D/Total Assets _{t-1}	0.085	0.052	0.102
Log R&D _{t-1}	2.53	2.45	2.25
Tobin's Q _{t-1}	2.12	1.65	1.59
Age _{t-1}	20.03	21.03	6.18
Total Assets _{t-1} ('000s)	3,483	529	12,630
Employment _{t-1}	6,107	1,987	12,690
<i>Panel 2: Establishment-year level variables</i>			
	Mean	Quasi- median	Standard deviation
Weak non-compete enforcement (state) (%)	61.3		
In high-tech industry (%)	64.1		
Employee entrepreneurship _{t+3} (%)	1.3	0.008	0.024
# employee-founded startups _{t+3}	1.15	0.78	1.91
Stayers _{t+3} (%)	47.8	0.523	0.260
Movers to incumbent firms (≥ 4 yrs old) _{t+3} (%)	26.3	0.225	0.181
Movers to new firms (≤ 3 yrs old) _{t+3} (%)	3.2	0.020	0.052
Movers to young firms (< 10 yrs old) _{t+3} (%)	7.2	0.056	0.076
Movers to high-tech young firms (< 10 yrs old) _{t+3} (%)	4.3	0.031	0.059
Depart employment data _{t+3} (%)	12.4	0.111	0.078
Number of employees _t	329	122	1,698

Note: Panel 1 shows summary statistics at the firm-year level (10,500 observations), and Panel 2 at the establishment-year level (36,000 observations). We do not show the median or standard deviation for indicators. Since Census disclosure procedures prohibit disclosure of percentile value, we approximate median with a quasi-median, which is estimated using a 99% weight on observations in the interquartile range and a 1% weight on the remaining observations.

Panel 3: Employee-founded startup level variables

	Mean	Quasi- median	Standard deviation
Incorporated (%)	69.8		
High-tech industry (%)	49.4		
Startup exit in 5 years (%)	52.5		
Ever received VC (%)	2.0		
Startup employment (in the first year)	11.83	5.41	29.85
Startup payroll (in the first year; '000s)	394	119	1,157

Panel 4: Comparison between employees who depart to entrepreneurship and those who depart to incumbents

	Workers who join founding teams of startups (≤ 3 yrs old)	Workers who move to incumbents (≥ 4 yrs old)
<i>A. Employee characteristics</i>		
Female (%)	33	41
White (%)	80	70
Foreign (%)	7.7	7.0
Education _t	13.7	13.5
Age _t	35.2	34.8
Tenure (at public firm; years) _t	2.07	1.99
Wages (at public firm; '000s) _t	57.8	39.7
<i>B. Public firm characteristics</i>		
Log R&D _{t-1}	3.80	3.71
ROA _{t-1}	0.17	0.17
Tobin's Q _{t-1}	2.19	2.08
Firm Age _{t-1}	21.7	22.3
Total Assets _{t-1} ('000s)	11.2	11.4
<i>C: Future employer characteristics</i>		
Firm Age _{t+3}	1.59	20.9
Employment _{t+3}	14.6	1,340
Payroll ('000s) _{t+3}	511	44,520

Note: Panel 3 shows summary statistics at the employee-founded startup level. All variables have 108,000 observations. Variables through “Ever received VC” are indicators, and the rest are continuous. Payroll is in thousands of dollars. Panel 4 shows means of variables at the employee level. “Workers who join founding teams of startups (≤ 3 yrs old)” refers to individuals who left the parent firm to join the startup’s founding team (108,000 observations). “Workers who move to incumbents (≥ 4 yrs old)” refers to individuals who left the parent firm to join already existing firms (2,900,000 observations). Wages are in thousands of real 2014 dollars.

Table 2: First Stage IV Results

Dependent variable: Log R&D _{t-1}						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Federal R&D tax price _{t-1}	-2.020*** (0.295)	-1.504*** (0.231)	-1.504*** (0.231)	-1.470*** (0.225)	-1.363*** (0.168)	-1.424*** (0.199)
State R&D tax price _{t-1}	-1.158* (0.691)	-0.950** (0.476)	-0.956** (0.476)	-0.978** (0.471)	-0.303 (0.375)	-0.947** (0.420)
Controls		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE			Yes	Yes		Yes
Industry (SIC3) FE				Yes		
Industry (SIC3)-year FE					Yes	
State-year FE					Yes	
Industry (SIC4) FE						Yes
N	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000
R ² (partial for the IV instruments)	0.032	0.027	0.026	0.026	0.022	0.025
F-test (instruments)	24.70	22.23	22.25	22.37	34.11	27.64

Note: This table shows the first stage of the instrumental variables analysis. The sample is an establishment-year panel of public firms. We predict parent firm R&D using firm-level federal and state tax prices of R&D, which are partially determined by tax credits that change across time, states, and depending on firm age. The federal R&D tax price is the log firm-level tax price of R&D, based on the federal tax credit, and following Hall (1993) and Bloom et al. (2013). The state R&D tax price is the log state-level tax price of R&D, following Bloom et al. (2013). See Section 4.2 and Appendix Section A.1 for details. Establishment controls are size and average wage. Firm controls are return on assets, sales growth, Tobin's Q, asset tangibility (PPE investment/total assets), size (log total assets), cash holdings, age, and an indicator for being diversified (having establishments in more than one SIC three-digit industry). Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 3: Effect of R&D on Non-entrepreneurial Employee Outcomes

Dependent variable:	Stayers _{t+3}		Depart employment data _{t+3}		Movers to incumbent firms _{t+3}	
	OLS (1)	IV (2)	OLS (3)	IV (4)	OLS (5)	IV (6)
Log R&D _{t-1}	-1.13 (0.72)	-0.39 (3.54)	-0.004 (0.133)	0.46 (0.87)	0.49 (0.61)	-2.22 (2.36)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry (SIC3) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000
Adj. R ²	0.385	-	0.222	-	0.356	-

Dependent variable:	Movers to young firms (<10 yrs old) _{t+3}		Movers to high-tech young firms (<10 yrs old) _{t+3}	
	OLS (7)	IV (8)	OLS (9)	IV (10)
Log R&D _{t-1}	0.35** (0.17)	1.50* (0.79)	0.23* (0.13)	0.76 (0.61)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry (SIC3) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000
Adj. R ²	0.294	-	0.253	-

Note: This table shows the effect of R&D on alternative employee outcomes. The sample is an establishment-year panel of public firms. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the percent of an establishment's workers in the 1st quarter of year zero who remain at the firm in the 1st quarter of year 3. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the percent of an establishment's workers in the 1st quarter of year zero who drop out of the employment sample by the 1st quarter of year three. Note, workers mainly depart the employment data coverage due to unemployment and departures out of the labor force (around 94 percent of workers in this group). Departures outside of the LEHD data coverage comprise around 6 percent of this group. In columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is the percent of an establishment's workers in the 1st quarter of year zero who move to a firm that is more than 3 years old by the 1st quarter of year three. In columns 7 and 8, the dependent variable is the percent of an establishment's workers in the 1st quarter of year zero who move to a firm that is less than 10 years old by the 1st quarter of year three. In columns 9 and 10, the dependent variable is the percent of an establishment's workers in the 1st quarter of year zero who move to a firm that is 10 or more years old and also high-tech by the 1st quarter of year three. Controls are the same as in Table 4 Panel 1. Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 4: Effect of R&D on Employee Entrepreneurship

<i>Panel 1</i>					
Dependent variable: Employee entrepreneurship _{t+3}					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log R&D _{t-1}	0.096** (0.045)	0.105** (0.050)	0.106** (0.051)	0.099* (0.052)	0.109* (0.060)
Log employment _t		-0.217*** (0.018)	-0.181*** (0.019)	-0.174*** (0.018)	-0.179*** (0.019)
Log payroll _t		-0.147*** (0.054)	-0.057 (0.054)	-0.082 (0.056)	-0.033 (0.054)
Firm age _{t-1}		-0.036 (0.036)	-0.033 (0.033)	-0.021 (0.028)	-0.003 (0.030)
Firm diversified _{t-1}		-0.123 (0.095)	-0.130 (0.095)	-0.135 (0.095)	-0.141 (0.100)
Sales growth _{t-1}		0.126 (0.089)	0.130 (0.090)	0.124 (0.091)	0.129 (0.099)
EBITDA _{t-1}		0.131 (0.261)	0.127 (0.260)	0.155 (0.261)	-0.112 (0.294)
Investment/Total assets _{t-1}		0.888 (0.543)	0.811 (0.543)	0.731 (0.553)	0.508 (0.617)
Log Tobin's Q _{t-1}		0.022 (0.066)	0.032 (0.067)	0.027 (0.067)	0.044 (0.077)
Log Total Assets _{t-1}		-0.011 (0.070)	-0.033 (0.069)	-0.054 (0.070)	-0.001 (0.066)
PPE investment/Total assets _{t-1}		-0.177 (0.382)	-0.058 (0.385)	-0.050 (0.393)	-0.063 (0.424)
Cash _{t-1}		-0.526* (0.308)	-0.502 (0.307)	-0.506 (0.315)	-0.521 (0.320)
Leverage _{t-1}		-0.016 (0.227)	0.052 (0.220)	0.069 (0.225)	0.187 (0.203)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE			Yes	Yes	
Industry (SIC3) FE			Yes		
Industry (SIC4) FE				Yes	
Industry (SIC3)-year FE					Yes
State-year FE					Yes
N	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000
Adj. R ²	0.156	0.167	0.176	0.184	0.180

Panel 2

Dependent variable: Employee entrepreneurship_{t+3}

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Log R&D _{t-1}	0.102** (0.052)	0.104** (0.051)	0.101** (0.051)
Average employee age _t		-0.036*** (0.007)	
Share employees female _t		-0.084 (0.165)	
Share employees white _t		0.713*** (0.169)	
Share employees foreign _t		0.508** (0.251)	
Average employee education _t		-0.055 (0.043)	
Average employee tenure _t		-0.023* (0.013)	
Average employee experience _t		0.004 (0.017)	
Log patent classes _{t-1}			0.227* (0.120)
Log patents _{t-1}			-0.137 (0.091)
Log forward citations _{t-1}			-0.006 (0.022)
Log backward citations _{t-1}			-0.005 (0.038)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE		Yes	Yes
Industry (SIC3) FE		Yes	Yes
Industry (SIC4) FE	Yes		
N	36,000	36,000	36,000
Adj. R ²	0.181	0.179	0.176

Note: This table shows the effect of corporate R&D on employee entrepreneurship. The sample is an establishment-year panel of public firms. The dependent variable is the percent of an establishment's workers as of 1st quarter of year zero who are entrepreneurs as of 1st quarter of year three. An entrepreneur is defined as a member of a firm's founding team: a person at a firm no more than 3 years old who is among the top 5 earners at that new firm. In Panel 2, controls are the same as in Panel 1. Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 5: Instrumented Effect of R&D on Employee Entrepreneurship

Dependent variable: Employee entrepreneurship _{t+3}						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Instrumented log R&D _{t-1}	0.577*** (0.207)	0.719*** (0.274)	0.659** (0.271)	0.648** (0.270)	0.587* (0.317)	0.598** (0.276)
Controls		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE				Yes		Yes
Industry (SIC3) FE			Yes	Yes		
Industry (SIC3)-year FE					Yes	
State-year FE					Yes	
Industry (SIC4) FE						Yes
N	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000

Note: This table shows the effect of instrumented R&D on employee entrepreneurship. The sample is an establishment-year panel of public firms. The first stage predicting R&D is shown in Table 2. The dependent variable is the percent of an establishment's workers as of 1st quarter of year zero who are entrepreneurs as of 1st quarter of year three. An entrepreneur is defined as a member of a firm's founding team: a person at a firm no more than 3 years old who is among the top 5 earners at that new firm. We do not display controls because Census limits the number of coefficients we may disclose. Establishment controls are size and average wage. Firm controls are return on assets, sales growth, Tobin's Q, asset tangibility (PPE investment/total assets), size (log total assets), cash holdings, age, and an indicator for being diversified (having establishments in more than one SIC three-digit industry). Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 6: Effect of R&D on Alternative Measures of Employee Entrepreneurship

<i>Panel 1</i>						
Dependent variable:	# Employee-founded startups _{t+3}		Employee entrepreneurship _{t+3}			
			Incorporated startups only		Top 3 earners (rather than top 5)	
	OLS (1)	IV (2)	OLS (3)	IV (4)	OLS (5)	IV (6)
Log R&D _{t-1}	0.067* (0.037)	0.324 (0.200)	0.083** (0.042)	0.464** (0.234)	0.099** (0.040)	0.507** (0.226)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry (SIC3) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000
Adj. R ²	0.154	-	0.183	-	0.154	-

<i>Panel 2</i>						
Dependent variable:	Employee entrepreneurship if present at startup founding _{t+3}		Employee entrepreneurship _{t+2}			
			1-yr old startups only			
	OLS (1)	IV (2)	OLS (3)	IV (4)	OLS (5)	IV (6)
Log R&D _{t-1}	0.082* (0.048)	0.595** (0.254)	0.076* (0.042)	0.472** (0.240)	0.057* (0.033)	0.175 (0.166)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry (SIC3) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000
Adj. R ²	0.171	-	0.131	-	0.097	-

Note: This table shows the effect of R&D on alternative measures of employee entrepreneurship. The sample is an establishment-year panel of public firms. For a detailed description of the dependent variables, see Section 5.4. Controls are the same as in Table 4 Panel 1. Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 7: Parent Variation in Effect of R&D on Employee Entrepreneurship

Dependent variable: Employee entrepreneurship _{t+3}				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log R&D _{t-1}	0.048 (0.057)	0.099* (0.052)	0.016 (0.062)	0.103** (0.052)
Log R&D _{t-1} ·High tech	0.083*** (0.029)			
Log R&D _{t-1} ·High patent generality _{t-1}		0.027* (0.016)		
Log R&D _{t-1} ·Large _{t-1}			0.130** (0.056)	
Log R&D _{t-1} ·IPO _{t-3,t-1}				0.072 (0.057)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry (SIC3) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000
Adj. R ²	0.176	0.176	0.176	0.176

Note: This table shows how the effect of corporate R&D on employee entrepreneurship varies by parent firm characteristics. The sample is an establishment-year panel of public firms. High Tech is 1 if the parent establishment is in a high-tech industry, and 0 if it is not. Large is 1 if the parent has above-median total assets (calculated at the firm-year level), and 0 if assets are below median. Old is 1 if the parent is of above-median age (calculated at the firm-year level), and 0 if it is below median. High patent generality is 1 if the parent has above-median patent generality (calculated at the industry-year level), and 0 if it is below median. IPO equals 1 if the firm went public in the past three years, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is the percent of an establishment's workers as of 1st quarter of year zero who are entrepreneurs as of the first quarter of year three. An entrepreneur is defined as a member of a firm's founding team: a person at a firm no more than 3 years old who is among the top 5 earners at that new firm. All specifications include the indicator variables that are used to interact with R&D (not reported). Controls are the same as in Table 4 Panel 1. Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 8: Effect of R&D on Employee Entrepreneurship by Startup Characteristics

<i>Panel 1: Predictors of VC-backed, employee-founded startups</i>			
Dependent variable: Employee-founded startup ever received VC			
	(1)		
Log R&D _{t-1}	0.007*** (0.001)	<i>...Continued</i>	
Employee age _t	0.001** (0.000)	Establishment log employment _t	0.001 (0.001)
Employee age ² _t	-0.000** (0.000)	Establishment average employee wage _t	0.012*** (0.003)
Employee female	-0.013*** (0.002)	Firm Age _{t-1}	-0.002*** (0.001)
Employee white	0.003** (0.001)	Firm Diversified _{t-1}	-0.003 (0.006)
Employee foreign	-0.002 (0.004)	Firm Sales growth _{t-1}	0.004 (0.006)
Employee born in state	-0.007*** (0.001)	Firm EBITDA _{t-1}	-0.008 (0.016)
Employee education	0.001*** (0.000)	Firm Investment/Total _{t-1}	-0.013 (0.041)
Employee experience _t	-0.000 (0.001)	Firm Log Tobin's Q _{t-1}	0.002 (0.004)
Employee tenure _t	-0.000 (0.000)	Firm Log Total Assets _{t-1}	-0.006*** (0.002)
Employee log earnings _t	0.008*** (0.002)	Firm PPE Investment/Total Assets _{t-1}	-0.004 (0.012)
Employee-founded startup age _{t+3}	0.007*** (0.001)	Firm Cash _{t-1}	0.076*** (0.015)
Employee-founded startup initial employment	0.008*** (0.002)	Firm Leverage _{t-1}	0.009 (0.007)
<i>Continued...</i>		Year-state FE	Yes
		Year-industry (SIC3) FE	Yes
		N	108,000
		Adj. R ²	0.079

Note: This table shows the effect of R&D on characteristics of employee entrepreneurship. The sample is at the employee-founded startup level. Based on the main variable used in Table 4, we identify whether the new firm associated with the departing employee has a given characteristic. The dependent variable in Panel 1 is 1 if the employee-founded startup ever received VC backing (either before or after the employee-founded startup is identified in year $t + 3$), and 0 if not. The “Employee...” controls in Panel 1 column 1 refer to the employee who left the parent to found a new firm. Standard errors are clustered by parent firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Panel 2: Employee-founded startup characteristics

Dependent variable:	Employee-founded startup...					
	is incorp.	in high- tech industry	log wages _{t+3}	exit _{t+5}	in same industry (SIC2) as parent	in same state as parent
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log R&D _{t-1}	0.008*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.004)	0.028*** (0.006)	0.007** (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-state FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	108,000	108,000	108,000	108,000	108,000	108,000
Adj. R ²	0.080	0.102	0.318	0.083	0.206	0.053

Note: This table shows the effect of R&D on characteristics of employee entrepreneurship. The sample is at the employee-founded startup level. Based on the main variable used in Table 4, we identify whether the new firm associated with the departing employee has a given characteristic. The dependent variable in Panel 2 column 1 (2) (4) (5) (6) is 1 if the employee-founded startup is an incorporated business (is in a high-tech industry) (the employee-founded startup exited by year 5) (in the same two-digit SIC code as the parent establishment) (is in the same state as the parent establishment), and 0 if not. In column 3, the dependent variable is the departing employee entrepreneur's log wages at the new firm in the 1st quarter of year three. An entrepreneur is defined as a member of a firm's founding team: a person at a firm no more than 3 years old who is among the top 5 earners at that new firm. Controls in Panel 2 are the same as in Panel 1, except that we include the indicator for being VC-backed as an additional control in Column 4. Standard errors are clustered by parent firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Panel 3: Input-output relationship between parent firm and startup industries

Dependent variable: Indicator for being in top 5% of closeness distribution

Supply chain closeness measure:	Parent upstream, employee-founded startup downstream		Parent downstream, employee-founded startup upstream	
	Downstream closeness	Upstream closeness	Downstream closeness	Upstream closeness
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log R&D _{t-1}	0.008** (0.003)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.006* (0.003)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-state FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-industry (SIC3) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	108,000	108,000	108,000	108,000
Adj. R ²	0.195	0.115	0.035	0.157

Note: This table shows the effect of R&D on employee entrepreneurship based on the supply chain relationship between the parent and the employee-founded startup. The sample is at the employee-founded startup level. The dependent variable is an indicator for the parent-startup pair having a measure of supply chain industry closeness that is in the top 5% of the overall closeness distribution across all parent-startup pairs. In columns 1 and 3, the measure is downstream closeness (downstream industry's share of upstream industry's product). In columns 2 and 4, the measure is upstream closeness (the upstream industry's share of what the downstream industry uses). In columns 1 and 2, the parent is assigned to the upstream industry and the employee-founded startup to the downstream industry (vice versa for columns 3 and 4). Controls are the same as in Table 8 Panel 1. Standard errors are clustered by parent firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Internet Appendix

A.1 Instrumental variables calculation and discussion

A.1.1 The Federal R&D tax credit

The first instrument is the federal tax price of R&D, which we denote ρ_{ft}^F . Implemented in 1981, the federal “Research and Experimentation” (R&E) tax credit permits firms to reduce their corporate income tax liability by the value of the credit. The credit was extremely complex to calculate (leading to a substantial simplification in 2009), and has changed over time. In the early 2000s, the total value of the federal credits was about \$5 billion per year (Wilson et al. 2005). In this description, we focus on the calculation of the credit between 1990 and 2005, which is the period during which we seek to predict public firm R&D.³⁵

Our approach closely follows Hall (1993) and Bloom et al. (2013). Calculating ρ_{ft}^F requires first identifying a firm’s effective R&D tax credit. This depends on a categorical variable derived from the qualified research expenditure (QRE) in that year; in particular, credit relies on the difference between actual QRE and a firm-specific “base.” QRE is research that occurs in the U.S., and is in one of three categories: salaries and wages, supplies, and contract research. The law is quite specific about what counts and what does not count as QRE. For example, QRE must be technological in nature and relate to new or improved function, performance, reliability, or quality. Among other excluded types, research after commercial production of a component, survey research, and social science research do not count.³⁶ The firm-specific base is the average of the ratio of QRE to sales between 1984 and 1988 multiplied by current sales, with a maximum of 16 percent. Firms defined in the law as “startups” have a different treatment. Their base is three percent, and the base then changes each year.

³⁵The calculation was quite different before 1989. In practice, we draw heavily from code originally written for Hall (1993).

³⁶The complete legal text is [here](#).

A final consideration is that starting in 1996, firms could elect the alternative incremental credit (AIC), in lieu of the R&E tax credit. This has three tiers depending on R&D intensity (QRE relative to sales); if intensity is 1-1.5% (1.5-2%) [$>2\%$], the AIC rate is 2.65% (3.2%) [3.75%], respectively. These rates have varied over time; they were lower in the late 1990s, and have increased in recent years. The firm chooses the AIC if it is larger than the effective R&D tax credit.

The next step is to deduct the credit from the firm's corporate tax liability. As part of this process, there are two adjustments for carry-backs/forwards, and for an R&D/GDP deflator. After these adjustments, we arrive at a federal tax price of R&D, which we denote ρ_{ft}^F . The credit is firm-specific, depending on age, sales, when the firm first had QRE, and the status of QRE spending this year. Also, the credit lapsed in 1995-96, which generates additional within-firm variation. ρ_{ft}^F can take values between zero and one. If $\rho_{ft}^F = 1$, then the firm should not treat R&D differently than other expenditures. If $\rho_{ft}^F < 1$, R&D is less expensive than other expenditures. A cheaper user cost of capital should incentivize the firm to invest more in R&D. As expected, we show in Appendix Table A.6 that when the tax price is below one, R&D increases as ρ_{ft}^F decreases.

There is substantial within-industry variation in ρ_{ft}^F , especially in manufacturing and services. The median tax price is well below 1 on average, so that R&D is cheaper than other spending. Within industries, the distributions have a negative skew (i.e., a longer right tail). In regressions, we verify substantial firm-level variation in the tax price of R&D. Firms in high tech areas such as pharmaceuticals and electronics, tend to have the most variation.

In the first stage, firm R&D does not mechanically pick up variation in the tax price that depends on past values of R&D. This obviates concern that, because historical firm variables are included in the tax price calculation, the tax price of R&D may somehow be a function of past R&D, which might then predict current R&D. Appendix Table A.7 shows that the instrument remains strong after controlling for past R&D. Columns 1 and 2 include firm fixed effects, and columns 3 and 4 add year fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 use a fourth degree polynomial in the previous year's R&D. Columns 3 and 4 include three lags of R&D. In all cases, the federal tax price of R&D significantly predicts R&D with a minimum t-statistic of 12.3. Because the tax price is calculated using highly non-linear function of firm age and sales variables, we can control for them not only in linear fashion, but also using higher

order polynomials. Appendix Table A.7 shows that firm R&D is robustly dependent on the tax price even after we include third polynomials of sales and firm age (columns 5-6).

A.1.2 State R&D tax credits

State R&D tax credits have been generally modeled on the federal one. The first state R&D tax credit was implemented in 1982 by Minnesota; by the end of our sample period, 40 states had some sort of R&D tax credit. The calculation of the base amount, and the definition of qualified R&D, can vary across states (Wilson et al. 2005). According to Miller & Richard (2010), manufacturing-intensive states, and those with one-party political control, are more likely to pass R&D tax credits. They argue that the tax credits primarily support incumbent R&D-conducting firms. To the best of our knowledge, the state credits are not refundable during the sample period.

The state instrument requires two objects: the state tax price component of the R&D user cost of capital, and a measure of the share of a firm's R&D that occurs in a given state. For both, we follow Bloom et al. (2013). First, we use the state tax price of R&D in Wilson (2009). He incorporated state level corporate income taxes, depreciation allowances, and R&D tax credits into this tax price component, which we call ρ_{st}^S .³⁷ These credits vary across states and time. They allow a firm to offset its state-level corporate tax liabilities, and they are calculated by weighting total firm profits according to the location of the firm's sales, employment, and property. Thus firms with R&D activities in the state will likely both have tax liability and R&D tax credit eligibility there.

The second object, θ_{fst} , is a proxy for a firm's R&D share in a given state-year. It is the 10-year moving average of the share of the firm's patent inventors located in state s .³⁸ The firm's state-level tax price is then $\rho_{ft}^S = \sum_s \theta_{fst} \rho_{st}^S$.

³⁷Specifically, it is roughly: $\frac{1-(tax\ credits+depr.\ allowances)}{1-tax\ rate}$.

³⁸The data is from NBER patent data, available [here](#).

A.1.3 Concerns

There are five potential concerns. Most importantly, the exclusion restriction is that tax credits cannot affect employee entrepreneurship. In a rigorous border county differences-in-differences model, Curtis & Decker (2018) show that R&D tax credits have no effect on startup formation. We also show empirically that there is no relation between the state tax credits and state-level startup creation, or the federal tax credit and national startup creation. We do this using two data sources, each of which have limitations. The first is the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS), which contains firm entry by state for our entire sample period, but does not have state-industry data.³⁹ The second is the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI), a publicly available dataset derived from the LEHD. While the QWI has state-industry level data, its coverage is poor in the early years of our data, with states being added over time.⁴⁰

At the state level we regress either the log number of new firms or the change in firm entry rates year to year on the tax price of R&D, as well as state and year fixed effects. The results are in Appendix Table A.8 Panels 1-2. We consider only R&D-intensive industries and cluster errors by state.⁴¹ We find that the tax credits have no correlation with startup entry (BDS data) or new firm employment growth (QWI data). This is true regardless of whether we use year and/or state fixed effects, and regardless of the standard error assumptions. At the federal level, we regress either the log number of new firms or the change in firm entry rates on the statutory federal R&D tax credit. This is, of course, very different from the firm-specific tax price of R&D that is calculated per the description in Section 7. This reflects baseline changes in the rate, which is then applied to a firm's specific situation. There are very few observations, and we do not use robust standard errors. The results, in Appendix Table A.8 Panel 3, again show no correlation.

More generally, the legal literature has argued that R&D tax credits are not useful to startups, because these firms have no or little taxable income against which to offset losses from failed R&D efforts. For example Bankman & Gilson (1999) note that “the U.S. tax code subsidizes R&D by existing successful companies by allowing losses from failed attempts at innovation to offset otherwise

³⁹This public version of the LBD is available [here](#).

⁴⁰We used a transformed version of the data used in Adelino et al. (2017), courtesy of Song Ma.

⁴¹NAICS codes 31-33, 51, and 54.

taxable income from other activities. Since startups have no other income against which their losses from a particular project may be set off, the government in effect gives established companies with a stable source of income an R&D tax subsidy that is not available to a startup entity.” Perhaps in response to this, a few states have recently made their R&D tax credits transferable, so that firms without revenue can potentially derive value from them. However, these policies occurred after the end of our sample period.

The second concern is that changes in state-level R&D tax credits may lead firms to geographically reallocate R&D (or misreport it such that it appears reallocated). For studies evaluating how a state-level R&D tax credit affects national R&D, this is a central concern. In our case, however, such reallocation will simply reduce the power of the instrument. As long as the combined instruments have adequate power, some degree of reallocation should not bias our findings. It does lead us to expect that the federal instrument will have more power than the state instrument, which is indeed what we find. This is because the federal instrument should have a larger effect on firms that only operate in the affected state, but most firms with positive R&D operate in multiple states.

The third concern is that the tax credits may not be large enough to affect R&D. The above sections pointed to substantial literature finding R&D responses to R&D tax credits that are large in economic magnitude and quite robust, especially for the federal instrument. The literature examining the state instrument finds large within-state elasticities, but also finds evidence of reallocation across states.

The fourth concern is that changes to the R&D tax credits may be anticipated by firms, which may then behave strategically to maximize their value. The federal tax credit formula is exceedingly complicated, as explained above, and it seems implausible that firms will optimize on all of the variables (especially firm age) in order to maximize the tax credit value. Strategic behavior around state tax credit changes would require firms in one state to respond by moving states. The tax credits are not large enough to merit such a response from many firms. For firms in multiple states, reallocation across states should attenuate the effect of the instrument. Beyond these points, note that the goal is to predict changes in R&D. Suppose that in order to maximize the tax credit benefit, firms

choose to conduct less R&D in the years immediately preceding the tax credit change and more in the years after. This does not obviously bias our main result, which is that changes to R&D affect employee entrepreneurship.

Finally, the fifth concern is that state decisions to adopt R&D tax credits could be endogenous, reflecting recent declines in R&D. Bloom et al. (2013) consider this possibility at length, and show that the results are robust to lagging the tax credit instruments for one and two periods. They also point out that cross-sectional variation in the state R&D tax credit rates is very large relative to the average rate within states, and also large relative to the secular increase in the tax credit generosity that has occurred over time. Finally, Chirinko & Wilson (2008), Chirinko & Wilson (2011), and Bloom et al. (2013) show that the level and timing of R&D tax credit adoption is uncorrelated with local economic observables like state R&D expenditure or per capita GDP, once year and state fixed effects are included.

In sum, we believe that R&D tax credits offer the best available quasi-exogenous source of variation driving corporate R&D that is plausibly unrelated to technological opportunities that could jointly give rise to parent R&D and employee entrepreneurship.

A.2 Out-of-sample test for benefit internalization

We directly assess the possibility that parents internalize employee-founded startups' benefits using an out-of-sample test based on the underlying data in Gompers et al. (2005). They connected all venture capital-backed startup executives in the VentureOne database to their prior employers.⁴² This sample should give an upper bound on possible internalized employee-founded startups because as these startups by definition received external investment, they are more likely than the average employee-founded startup to have received investment from their former employer. We begin with 13,612 entrepreneur-parent pairs. The entrepreneurs are founders of 6,499 unique startups. There are 9,152 unique parents, which we linked to VentureXpert acquisition and investment data.⁴³ Seventy-four percent of the unique startups matched to at least one investor or acquirer, yielding

⁴²Their time period, 1986 to 1999, overlaps with our primary Census data (1990 to 2005).

⁴³In many cases, employee-founded startups have multiple parents (that is, there are multiple executives with prior jobs).

20,478 unique startup-investor pairs.⁴⁴

Finally, among the unique investors and acquirers in these pairs, only 208 match to parents. This is just 2.3 percent of the 9,152 unique parents in the original Gompers et al. (2005) data, providing evidence that parents do not usually internalize employee-founded startups by investing in or acquiring them. There are 266 unique startups where the parent matches an investor or acquirer, 5.6 percent of the startups matched to VentureXpert.⁴⁵ Of these, 192 are investment deals, and 74 are acquisitions. Some parents have multiple startups, such as IBM and Highland Capital Partners, so the parent and startup numbers do not match. Some parents that invested in or acquired their employee-founded startups are corporates, including Seagate, Xerox, Monsanto, Johnson & Johnson, and Microsoft. Others are asset managers, including Accel Partners, SoftBank Vision Group, and Equus Capital. Still others are non-corporates, including Boston University. We identified 41 parent firms that are clearly venture funds or other asset managers. This leaves 167 parents that are potentially R&D-investing companies.

One concern may be that many corporate parents may not be covered as investors or acquirers in VentureXpert. We match 2,617 of the parents to investors or acquirers in VentureXpert. The most conservative framing of our results, then, restricts the parent population to firms that ever invested in or acquired a startup in VentureXpert. In this case, 7.9 percent of parents (208 out of 2,617) invest in or acquire their employee-founded startups. This extreme upper bound is still small and confirms that it is unlikely that parents generally internalize the benefits of their employee-founded startups.

The parent could also appropriate the employee-founded startup's benefits through technology licensing deals. We cannot assess this possibility with our data, but we think it unlikely that the parent can fully internalize the employee-founded startup's social benefits through such arms-length contracts.

Consistent with the out-of-sample test, in our data we find that the interaction between R&D

⁴⁴Note that the underlying dataset, from Dow Jones Venture Source, is of venture capital-backed startups. In theory, if we used VentureSource, we should match 100 percent to initial investors. However, as Kaplan & Lerner (2016) and Maats et al. (2011) explain, VentureXpert's coverage is much better than Venture Source (it contains more than 40 percent more investments). VentureXpert also has superior acquisition data, and Venture Source's data quality has declined over time. We are most interested in whether parents ultimately invested in (and especially acquired) employee-founded startups, so VentureXpert seems like the optimal data set to use. If there is any bias, it should be the case that the employee-founded startups that do not match have lower rates of subsequent investment and acquisition, since the commercial databases often backfill based on exit events.

⁴⁵We matched on the company's first word, which yielded 275 matches. This enables successful matches such as "Xerox Venture Capital" to "Xerox." We then manually removed obviously wrong matches, erring on the side of leaving the match to be conservative in ambiguous cases.

and the parent having a corporate venture capital program has no effect on employee entrepreneurship. These results are consistent with Ma (2016), who finds that public firms launch corporate venture capital programs when internal innovation is poor, invest in startups in their own industries, and invest in geographically distant startups. That is, corporate venture capital is a way to outsource innovation. This is the opposite of the corporate environment that yields R&D-induced employee entrepreneurship. Instead, when corporate R&D increases at innovative firms, it seems to serendipitously produce “extra” growth options, and employee entrepreneurship is an unintended consequence.

Table A.1: Sample Composition by Industry

<i>Panel 1: 1990 -2001</i>		
	<u>In Sample</u>	<u>Out of Sample</u>
Construction	4.8%	4.1%
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	5.6%	6.3%
Manufacturing	15.4%	15.8%
Mining	0.6%	0.4%
Services	27.9%	28.8%
Total Government	16.4%	17.2%
Trade	23.7%	22.6%
Transportation and Public Utilities	5.5%	4.8%

<i>Panel 2: 2002-2008</i>		
	<u>In Sample</u>	<u>Out of Sample</u>
Construction	5.6%	4.8%
Educational Services	1.9%	2.4%
Financial Activities	5.9%	6.3%
Government	16.3%	17.0%
Health Care and Social Assistance	10.9%	11.6%
Information	2.2%	2.5%
Leisure and Hospitality	9.9%	9.1%
Manufacturing	10.6%	10.7%
Mining and Logging	0.6%	0.3%
Other Services	4.0%	3.9%
Professional and Business Services	12.3%	12.8%
Retail Trade	11.6%	11.1%
Transportation and Warehousing	3.4%	2.8%
Utilities	0.4%	0.4%
Wholesale Trade	4.4%	4.2%

Note: This table compares the data in our sample (from 31 states) to national data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Employment Statistics (CES) Survey from 1990-2008. This is done separately for the pre-2002 and post-2002 periods because before 2002, the BLS used SIC codes, while after 2002, it used NAICS codes. Panel 1 shows the pre-2002 industries, and Panel 2 the post-2002 industries. We divide state-industry level employment by total state employment across all states in our sample. We do this for each year, and then average across years. We compare this to the analogous figure for states that are not in our sample (right column).

Table A.2: Industry Composition by Sample

<i>Panel 1: 1990 - 2001</i>		
	<u>In Sample</u>	<u>Out of Sample</u>
Construction	63.7%	36.3%
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	57.4%	42.6%
Manufacturing	59.4%	40.6%
Mining	69.4%	30.6%
Services	59.2%	40.8%
Total Government	58.8%	41.2%
Trade	61.1%	38.9%
Transportation and Public Utilities	63.2%	36.8%
Total Observations	60.0%	40.0%

<i>Panel 2: 2002-2008</i>		
	<u>In Sample</u>	<u>Out of Sample</u>
Construction	64.5%	35.5%
Educational Services	55.0%	45.0%
Financial Activities	59.6%	40.4%
Government	59.9%	40.1%
Health Care and Social Assistance	59.5%	40.5%
Information	57.5%	42.5%
Leisure and Hospitality	62.7%	37.3%
Manufacturing	60.6%	39.4%
Mining and Logging	71.9%	28.1%
Other Services	61.6%	38.4%
Professional and Business Services	59.9%	40.1%
Retail Trade	61.8%	38.2%
Transportation and Warehousing	65.3%	34.7%
Utilities	59.6%	40.4%
Wholesale Trade	62.3%	37.7%
Total Observations	62.3%	37.7%

Note: This table compares the data in our sample (from 31 states) to national data from the BLS Current Employment Statistics (CES) Survey from 1990-2008. This is done separately for the pre-2002 and post-2002 periods because before 2002, the BLS used SIC codes, while after 2002, it used NAICS codes. Panel 1 shows the pre-2002 industries, and Panel 2 the post-2002 industries. Each percent is the share of people employed in an industry in our sample states (left column) versus the other states (right column).

Table A.3: Effect of R&D on Employee Entrepreneurship at the Employee Level

Dependent variable: Employee entrepreneurship _{t+3}						
	OLS	IV		OLS	IV	
		First stage	Second stage		First stage	Second stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log R&D _{t-1}	0.00048** (0.00)		0.003** (0.00)	0.00039** (0.00)		0.003** (0.00)
Federal R&D tax price _{t-1}		-1.429*** (0.21)			-1.488*** (0.20)	
State R&D tax price _{t-1}		-0.152 (0.56)			-0.233 (0.53)	
Employee controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes			
State-year FE				Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry (SIC3)-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N (millions)	11.9	11.9	11.9	11.9	11.9	11.9
Adj. R ²	0.00			0.01		
R ² (partial for the IV instruments)		0.02			0.02	
F-test (instruments)		23.10			26.80	

Note: This table shows the effect of R&D on employee entrepreneurship. The sample is an establishment-year panel of public firms. The dependent variable equals 1 if an employee as of first quarter of year zero becomes an entrepreneur as of 1st quarter of year three, and 0 otherwise. An entrepreneur is defined as a member of a firm's founding team: a person at a firm no more than 3 years old who is among the top 5 earners at that new firm. The mean of the dependent variable is 0.0091. We do not display controls because we are limited by Census in the number of coefficients we may disclose. Employee controls are age, age squared, education, total experience in years, tenure at the firm, log earnings in year 0, and indicators for being female, white, foreign, and born in state. Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A.4: Effect of Alternative Measures of R&D on Employee Entrepreneurship

Dependent variable:	Employee entrepreneurship _{t+3}	# Employee-founded startups _{t+3}	Employee entrepreneurship _{t+3}		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Above median $\Delta R\&D_{t-1}$	0.089*** (0.033)	0.070*** (0.024)			
Top 10 pct $\Delta R\&D_{t-1}$			0.132** (0.067)		
Bottom 10 pct $\Delta R\&D_{t-1}$				-0.105** (0.053)	
R&D/Total Assets _{t-1}					0.887* (0.529)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry (SIC3) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000
Adj. R^2	0.176	0.154	0.176	0.176	0.180

Note: This table shows the effect of alternative measures of R&D on employee entrepreneurship. The sample is an establishment-year panel of public firms. Change (Δ) in R&D is defined as: $\frac{R\&D_{t-1} - R\&D_{t-2}}{.5 \cdot (R\&D_{t-1} + R\&D_{t-2})}$. Top 10 pct $\Delta R\&D_{t-1}$ is 1 if the firm had a change in R&D that is in the top 10 percentiles in that year, and 0 if it is in the bottom 90 percentiles. Bottom 10 pct $\Delta R\&D_{t-1}$ is defined analogously. In columns 1, 3, 4 and 5, the dependent variable is the percent of an establishment's workers as of the first quarter of year zero who are entrepreneurs as of the first quarter of year three. An entrepreneur is defined as a member of a firm's founding team: a person at a firm no more than 3 years old who is among the top 5 earners at that new firm. In column 2, the the dependent variable is the number of unique startups associated with entrepreneurs in the column 1 definition normalized by the pre-period employment and expressed in percentage points. Controls are the same as in Table 4 Panel 1. Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A.5: Reverse Causality Test (Effect of Employee Entrepreneurship on R&D)

Dependent variable: Log R&D _t			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
One-year employee entrepreneurship _{t-2, t-1}	0.008 (0.005)		
Two-year employee entrepreneurship _{t-3, t-1}		0.001 (0.006)	
Three-year employee entrepreneurship _{t-4, t-1}			-0.005 (0.003)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry (SIC3) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	36,000	36,000	36,000
Adj. R ²	0.879	0.879	0.879

Note: This table shows that past employee entrepreneurship does not predict current corporate R&D. The sample is an establishment-year panel of public firms. The independent variables are lagged variations on our main employee entrepreneurship rate measures used as the dependent variable in Tables 4 and 5. The one-year employee entrepreneurship_{t-1} rate is the percent of an establishment's workers as of the first quarter of year $t - 1$ who are entrepreneurs as of the first quarter of year t , which is the year that R&D is measured (the dependent variable). The two-year employee entrepreneurship_{t-2} rate is the percent of an establishment's workers as of the first quarter of year $t - 2$ who are entrepreneurs as of the first quarter of year t . The three-year employee entrepreneurship_{t-3} rate is the percent of an establishment's workers as of the first quarter of year $t - 3$ who are entrepreneurs as of the first quarter of year t . An entrepreneur is defined as a member of a firm's founding team: a person at a firm no more than 3 years old who is among the top 5 earners at that new firm. Controls are the same as in Table 4 Panel 1. Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A.6: Relationship Between Federal Tax Price Regions and R&D

Dependent variable: Log R&D _t			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
1 Federal R&D tax price _t < 0.99	0.18*** (0.016)		
1 0.95 ≤ Federal R&D tax price _t < 0.99		0.15*** (0.016)	0.15*** (0.017)
1 Federal R&D tax price _t < 0.95		0.22*** (0.017)	
1 0.90 ≤ Federal R&D tax price _t < 0.95			0.21*** (0.018)
1 Federal R&D tax price _t < 0.90			0.24*** (0.02)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	53,151	53,151	53,151
R ²	0.92	0.92	0.92

Note: This table shows the relationship between dummy variables for the federal tax price of R&D in a given region and log R&D. Observations are at the firm-year level. The tax price can take values between 0 and 1; the minimum value is 0.845 in our sample. If the tax price is close to 1, then the firm should not treat R&D differently than other expenditure. If tax price is below 1, R&D is less expensive than other expenditure because of the tax credit. In column 1, within-firm R&D is 18 percent higher when the firm's tax price is below 0.99 relative to the values close to one. Note, we use a 0.99 cutoff instead of 1 because there is a large mass of observations arbitrarily close to 1, which are unlikely to incentivize a large increase in R&D. Columns 2 and 3 show that in regions in which the tax price is below 1, R&D is monotonically increasing with the decrease in the tax price. Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A.7: First Stage IV Results Controlling for Past R&D

Dependent variable: Log R&D _t						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Federal R&D tax price _t	-1.3*** (0.083)	-1.4*** (0.084)	-1.1*** (0.089)	-1.2*** (0.091)	-1.4*** (.18)	-1.5*** (.19)
Log R&D _{t-1}	0.67*** (0.011)	0.65*** (0.011)	0.65*** (0.013)	0.64*** (0.014)		
Log R&D ² _{t-1}	0.023*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.002)				
Log R&D ³ _{t-1}	-0.003*** (0.0006)	-0.003*** (0.0006)				
Log R&D ⁴ _{t-1}	0.0002*** (0.00006)	0.0002*** (0.00006)				
Log R&D _{t-2}			0.027* (0.014)	0.027* (0.014)		
Log R&D _{t-3}			0.0026 (0.0099)	-0.014 (0.01)		
Sales _t					0.11*** (0.009)	0.098*** (0.014)
Sales ² _t					-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Sales ³ _t					0.0003*** (0.00009)	0.0003*** (0.00009)
Age _t					0.034*** (0.0062)	0.034*** (0.0063)
Age ² _t					-0.0002*** (0.00004)	-0.0002*** (0.00004)
Age ³ _t					2.6e-07*** (6.5e-08)	2.6e-07*** (6.5e-08)
Year FE		Yes		Yes		Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	56,697	56,697	41,630	41,630	34,987	34,987
R ²	0.95	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.94	0.94

Note: This table shows that the federal tax price of R&D predicts R&D after controlling for past R&D or polynomials in age and sales. This tests the robustness of the first stage of the instrumental variables analysis (Table 2). Sales are in millions of dollars. Age is defined according to the R&D tax credit legislation, where it is defined as the number of years from the first time the firm reported positive R&D. The requirement of positive age reduces the sample size for columns 5 and 6. The sample is an establishment-year panel of public firms. The federal R&D tax price is the log firm-level tax price of R&D, based on the federal tax credit, and following Hall (1993) and Bloom et al. (2013). Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A.8: Relationship Between State Tax Price of R&D and State New Firm Formation

<i>Panel 1: Quarterly Workforce Indicator (LEHD) data</i>				
Dependent variable	Log 2-year employment growth		Change in 2-year-old firm total employment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
State tax price of R&D	-0.74 (0.59)	0.33 (0.36)	-117 (7912)	-6.5 (57677)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No	Yes	No
N	449	449	448	447
R^2	0.44	0.43	0.11	0.11

<i>Panel 2: Business Dynamics Statistics Data</i>				
Dependent variable	Log 2-year employment growth		Change in 2-year-old firm total employment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
State tax price of R&D	-0.11 (0.37)	0.04 (0.08)	188 (1619)	-583 (981)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	No	Yes	No
N	1530	1530	1529	1529
R^2	0.24	0.00	0.02	0.00

Note: This table shows estimates of the relationship between last year's state tax price of R&D (from Wilson 2009), and employment growth at new firms. Panel 1 uses data from the QWI, courtesy of Song Ma. Firms are limited to R&D-intensive (high tech) sectors. Panel 2 uses data from the BDS, where all firms are used because the data do not include industry information. Errors are clustered at the state level.

<i>Panel 3</i>				
Data source:	Quarterly Workforce Indicator (LEHD) data		Business Dynamics Statistics Data	
Dependent variable	Log 2-year employment growth	Change in 2-year- old firm total employment	Log 2-year employment growth	Change in 2-year-old firm total employment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Federal R&D credit	4.4 (7.3)	-39912 (885697)	-0.19 (0.16)	-377227 (274243)
N	16	15	30	37
R^2	0.03	0.00	0.05	0.05

Note: This panel shows estimates of the relationship between last year's federal tax price of R&D, and employment growth at new firms.